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I 
 
  
Cai Shen (财神) is the Chinese god of prosperity, worshipped in Chinese indigenous 
religion and Taoism. Especially during the Spring Festival period, incense is burned in 
Cai Shen’s temple, and friends will joyously exchange the traditional greeting “Gong 
Xi Fa Cai” (Chinese:恭喜发财; English: May you become rich). Many Chinese firms 
also put Cai Shen’s statue at the entrance and worship him every day to bring good 
fortune. 
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Abstract 
With China’s ever-increasing economic growth and engagement in the world economy, 
its M&A activity has been increasing dramatically and drawing attention. This thesis 
analyzes Chinese M&A bid premia through an in-depth comparison with non-Chinese 
M&A transactions. Discriptive statistics show that most Chinese M&A transactions 
are domestic and occur after 2002; acquirers are mostly from the investment 
commodity industry, and targets are widely dispered across industries. I also discuss 
the different classes of shares listed on Chinese mainland stock exchanges and their 
implications for bid premia analysis. Parametric and non-parametric comparisons 
indicate that, on average, Chinese acquirers pay a lower premium, especially for 
targets from the Chinese mainland and/or listed in US stock markets. Premium 
comparisons over time and across industries reveal that Chinese acquisition bid 
premia are lower in most times and industries, and the concentration of Chinese 
acquisitions in low-than-average premia contexts is also responsible for the lower 
average overall premia. General-to-specific regression analysis shows that target 
country, stock exchange, time and acquirer/target industry-specific factors explain the 
majority of the bid premium differentials. A further break down reveals that target 
region factors and deal characteristics play the most important roles, while time and 
stock exchange-specific factors also increase bid premia differentials. 
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1 Introduction  
With the spectacular economic growth and the “Go Global” government policy, 
Chinese capital markets are becoming more and more active. Especially in the M&A 
arena, the transaction volume has increased dramatically. According to research 
conducted by Baker & McKenzie and Rhodium Group, merely in Europe the deals 
have increased nine times within 4 years (from $2 billion in 2010 to $18 billion in 
2014). Moreover, single deals initiated by Chinese acquirers are often big enough to 
reshape the industry. Prominent Chinese deals such as the alliance between TCL and 
Thomson SA of France in 2003, or Geely’s acquisition of Swedish Volvo Cars in 2010, 
have demostrated Chinese firms’ engagement in global M&A activities.  
Alongside the ever-increasing growth of Chinese acquisitions, the media are focusing 
attention on this topic. Every year The Economist publishes a series of special reports 
for Chinese acquisition analysis, such as “China buys up the world” or “Being eaten 
by the dragon --What it feels like to be bought by a Chinese firm”, prepared with 
special insights from both acquirer and target perspectives. Some other media, such as 
Forbes, also provide many specialized case or trend analyses for Chinese acquisitions.  
However, most academic and non-acadenic reports do limit their M&A analyses to 
either a gobal view (i.e. treating China as one of many nations ), or mererly American 
market transactions, and Chinese acquisition analyses are always bound to general 
descriptions of motives, or cultural intergration in post-acquisition period. Few 
researches have touched upon Chinese acquisition time trend, industry, target country 
and/or stock exchanges clusterings, and the potential differences from other countries. 
The very limited preior research on this area by Asplund & Kjellesvik (2012) suggests 
that the average Chinese takeover premia is not different from non-Chinese ones, but 
this runs contrary to the popular press, which seems to believe that wealthy Chinese 
firms are paying huge premia to buy up many western firms. Therefore, it is hard to 
tell whether Chinese acquirers pay different bid premia. So this thesis is developed to 
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fill the gap, and reveal the existence of difference in premia paid and the underlying 
rationales.  
The thesis is set out as follows. First, a comprehensive literature review on general 
M&A introduction, driver motives, existing bid premia analysis frameworks, and 
Chinese acquisition specificities is presented, and general hypothesis on Chinese bid 
premia difference is proposed. Then I will introduce the selected dataset and 
methodology utilized in this study. The third part is the general description of Chinese 
M&A acitivities with regard to the time, industry, country and stock exchange 
characteristics. Afterwards, simple parametric and non-parametric comparisons are 
conducted for Chinese and non-Chinese acquisitions from these four aspects. In the 
regression analysis part, dependent and independent variables are introduced and two 
general-to-specific regression models are computed using different variable sets. The 
following session reveals the regression results and further discussion issues (such as 
the break down of bid premia differentials). In the last two chapters, general 
conclusions are derived from the analysis, and limitations and further research areas 
are proposed.  
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2 Literature review 
There is an extensive literature in M&A analysis. This section will start with a general 
introduction and history of M&As. Thereafter, economic motives of M&A 
transactions, which constitute the primary foundation for bid premia determination, 
are introduced. Then I will introduce the existing literature on acquisition premia with 
regards to different value drivers. Finally, specificities of Chinese M&A are discussed 
and the main hypotheses on Chinese bid premia difference are proposed. 
2.1 M&A in general 
 
M&A is a corporate strategy involving purchase and sales of firms, partially or 
completely, and M&A transactions may differ in various dimensions (Pettersson et al, 
2013). For example, from the perspective of acquisition attitude, the transaction can 
be either hostile or friendly (Morck et al, 1988); Depending on the business relations 
between the acquirers and targets a transaction can be a horizontal merger (one 
competitor buys another) to obtain economies of scale or eliminate competition, or a 
vertical merger (a customer buys a supplier or vice versa) to reduce transaction costs 
between the corporate value chains, or a diversified conglomerate merger (the buyer 
constructs a portfolio of unrelated companies) for diversification or other purpose 
(Gugler et al, 2003) .  
M&A is always of long-standing interest to economists and the financial community 
(Melicher et al, 1983), and references to merger activity can be dated back to as far as 
the 17th century. Historically, M&A transactions always have the tendency to cluster 
by time and industry, which ultimately contributes to “merger waves” (Duchin & 
Schmidt, 2013, Harford, 2005, Martynova & Renneboog, 2008, etc).  
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Figure 1: Illustration of merger waves in US (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008) 
The earliest peak of M&A activities is generally accepted to have occurred in the 
1890s, when technological innovation and favorable stock market conditions triggered 
horizontal merger clustering. This wave ended in 1904, when the stock market crash 
ruined the market. Afterwards, due to improvements in stock market and technology, 
as well as the regulation of horizontal mergers, vertical mergers became popular in the 
1910s-1929. Similar improvements applied to the world economy in the 1950s-1973, 
when the third “wave” of diversified conglomerate mergers took place.  
The fourth takeover wave commenced in 1981. In addition to the common causes 
specified already, this merger wave coincided with the deregulation of the financial 
services sector, capital market innovation, etc. Thus more LBO and PE transactions 
occurred. In 1993-2001, continued economic growth and industry-specific shocks (e.g. 
deregulation, technological innovation) caused M&A transactions in almost all sectors 
and many mega-mergers also took place during this period. The second most recent 
merger wave was 2003-2007, when the stock market was reaching a high and many 
derivatives were introduced into financial markets.  
After the 2008 meltdown, the world economy has started recovering and financial 
markets are becoming more active. It seems a new merger wave is forming. Likewise, 
I suspect Chinese M&A actitivity may follow a similar growth pattern in waves, thus 
a parallel Chinese merger wave introduction is to be present in the next chapter.  
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2.2 M&A motives 
Although M&A grew dramatically over the last few decades, controversies remain 
regarding the underlying motives. For example, according to Trautwein (1990), up to 
7 theories may apply to describe the merger decision as a rational choice, a process 
outcome or a macroeconomic phenomenon. Fortunately, some widely-accepted 
categorizations of merger motives are shared by empirical studies. The framework I 
will utilize is based on Narayanan & Berkovitch (1993) and Koppens (2010), which 
group the motives into three categories: the synergy motive, the  agency motive and 
the hubris motive. In addition, I would like to incorporate one more: the 
diversification motive, due to its interaction with the other motives and high relevance 
in the premia analysis.   
2.2.1 The synergy motive  
Defined as increased competitiveness, where the combined future cash flows of two 
firms are bigger than those which the companies would have realized on their own, so 
synergy shall be an essential driver and determinant of M&A transactions and their 
premia. Moreover, the synergies can be achieved from either operating synergies or 
financial synergies (Damodaran, 2005). 
Operating synergies often result from economies of scale and/or economies of scope 
by cost reduction (e.g. R&D, production), or revenue enhancement (e.g. 
complimentary sales, monopoly power). Financial synergies can be achieved by 
matching cash-rich firms with firms with investment opportunities, thereby lowering 
the cost of capital (e.g. increasing debt capacities).  
Synergy motives are well developed and examined by earlier studies. Gerchak & 
Gupta (2002) propose that the production characteristics of both the bidder and the 
target matter in the operating synergy, especially the production flexibilities and 
independent markets existence. Leland (2007) focuses exclusively on activities with 
nonsynergistic operational cash flows, and highlights that purely financial benefits, 
such as the leverage effects, may create or destroy acquisition value as well.  
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Overall, synergies - as the primary economic driver of M&A activities - are always 
shared by both parties, and usually serve as the general reference for takeover premia 
determination. 
2.2.2 The agency motive 
Agency problems arise when the ownership and control of a business are separated. 
They may appear in different forms, but the main issue is that M&A transactions are 
likely to take place when the acquirer or target management may pursue their personal 
benefits from the transaction at the cost of shareholders. For example, under the “free 
cash flow hypothesis”, managers are reluctant to pay out cash to maintain flexibility 
and avoid signaling to external stakeholders, so they may take on value-destroying 
acquisitions when running out of good ones (Jensen, 1986). The empirical evidence 
also suggests that cash-rich firms are more likely to initiate M&A transactions and 
encounter a decline in performance afterwards (Harford, 1999). While, under the 
“increasing reliance hypothesis”, if the acquisition may increase the firm’s 
dependence on the management, such transactions are more likely to be initiated by 
the manager (Narayanan & Berkovitch, 1993). In a similar manner, the possibility of 
retaining the target CEO after acquisition, and high severance pay to target 
management in the case of acquisition, greatly reduce the bid premia and increase the 
success likehood (Qiu, Trapkov, & Yakoub, 2014).   
Therefore, agency-based motives may be among the most important triggers of M&A 
and are likely to happen when divergence between control and ownership of the firm 
exist, and management’s benefits are affected. However, due to high subjectivity, 
motives cannot be easily quantified, and are always inferred using proxy variables.  
2.2.3 The hubris motive 
The hubris hypothesis was proposed by Roll (1986) and outlines a the situation where 
the biding firm’s management believe they possess a better estimation of target firm 
value than the market. So they may pay too high a premium for the target, or even 
engage in the takeovers without economic gains. The main difference between the 
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hubris problem and the agency problem is that, with the latter, management actually 
know that they may overpay for the target, but they would like to proceed with the 
acquisition for their own sake.  
Like the agency motive, hubris is not easily quantifiable. Hayward & Hambrick (1997) 
propose a list of CEO hubris indicators and reveal a positive relationship with the bid 
premia. Moreover, if the hubris envolvement is taken into account, CEOs may learn 
from experience and progressively correct their over-optimism (Roll et al, 2005). 
2.2.4 The diversification motive 
Diversification indicates the acquirers’ entry into a new business sector. On the one 
hand, the potentially reduced cash flow volatility and cost of capital may create value 
for the combined companies; on the other hand, it is argued that the investors can 
diversify their own portfolios in a less costly way and the potential agency costs of a 
conglomerate may destroy value (Ofek & Berger, 1995).   
Empirical studies present different findings regarding diversification effects. Vishny et 
al (1990) and Comment & Jarrell (1995) suggest that less focused firms exhibit 
negative returns after acquisitions historically. Others argue that, under certain 
circumstances, diversification indeed creates value for the firm. Lang & Fan (2000) 
reveal that, though vertically related firms do poorly, complementary firms show 
higher values after acquisition. Selcuk & Kiymaz (2013) also find that if an 
acquisition is made by an independent firm, diversifying acquisitions generate higher 
abnormal returns. Due to conflicting findings, scholars such as Limmack (2003) 
simply claim that no definitive conclusions can be reached from the evidence.  
To sum up, the existing literature provides various views on the motives of M&A 
transactions. However, in reality they are often interacted with each other. For 
example, Anju, Song, & Pettit (2000) suggest the coexistence of hubris with synergy 
to explain their positive total gains sample, while the managerialism (agency) motive 
and synergy motive together explain the negative total gains.  
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2.3 Premia analysis 
Once an acquisition decision is made, the next step is the determination of the bid 
premium. Alongside the world M&A activity envolvement, takeover premium 
analysis frameworks also developed to a large extent. 
From the 1980s, scholars started exploring the determinants of takeover premia by 
regression analysis on potential factors. Walkling & Edmister (1985) set up a 
regression model based on 108 tender offers in 1976-1977, and found a significant 
negative relationship between target group bid premia and target financial leverage, 
valuation ratio (M/B ratio), percentage of shares controlled by bidders before 
acquisition, and a positive effect from competing bidders. Varaiya (1987) regressed 77 
target acquisition premia during 1975-1980 on bidder’s acquision gain estimations 
and target’s bargaining strength indicators, thus revealing a significant positive 
relationship between takeover premia and bidding competitions, as well as the 
existence of anti-takeover amendments. 
In the 1990s, researches continued complimenting the existing literature and building 
a more comprehensive analysis framework. Slusky & Caves (1991) analyzed 100 
non-financial firm acquisitions in 1986-1988 from the synergy and agency 
perspectives, and illustrated an increase in potential premia with the difference of debt 
ratios between target and acquirer 1 , as well as the decrease in management’s 
ownership of acquiring firms. Moreover, the presence of either actual or potential 
rival bidders was proved to have a powerful effect on all existing explanatory factors 
and exhibit a significant positive relationship with the premium. Haunschild (1994) 
further took into consideration the target performance uncertainty (i.e., the ratio of the 
standard deviation to the mean), transaction-specific factors (e.g. investment bankers’ 
overall performance) and time fixed effects, in addition to synergies and target 
performance factors. Billett & Ryngaert (1997) brought in new target country-specific 
                                                             
1 The higher the difference between debt ratios, the more likely it is that acquirers will level up debt and enjoy the 
financial leverage.  
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factors and used weighted nonlinear least squares estimation to improve existing 
methods. Hambrick & Hayward (1997) complemented the framework by introducing 
executives’ hubris factors into regression analysis, thus revealing a significant positive 
relationship between takeover premia and target officers’ holdings, recent acquirer 
performance, media praise for the CEO and so on.  
Since the 2000s, especially after the five world merger waves identified by Bruner 
(2004), more and more M&A transaction data become available, enabling researchers 
to conduct more specialized analysis and push the premium analysis further. Rossi & 
Volpin (2004) argued that the M&A transactions should be analyzed from a more 
comprehensive perspective, including the cross-border indicator, shareholder 
protection, target countries, and so on. While Moeller et al. (2005) merely paid special 
attentention to the large loss-making deals during the preceding merger wave.   
In recent studies, scholars focus more on specific effects of certain variables while 
seting up other target and deal characteristics as control variables. For example, Ficha 
et al(2013) examine the effect of golden parachutes on premia, inaddition to target 
size, a private acquirer indicator, and so on. In Qiu et al (2014), the relationship 
between takeover premia and different target CEO characteristics are tested, together 
with other target and deal characteristics.  
To summarize, M&A takeover premium research has made huge progress in recent 
decades, and comprehensive yet sophiscated analytical frameworks are being 
developed. In light of some widely-accepted frameworks, I classify the premium 
determinants discussed in different literatures in the following table. 
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Study 
Acquirer 
characteristics 
Target characteristics Transaction characteristics Others 
Walkling & 
Edmister (1985) 
  Debt/Assets*** (-), M/B ratio*** (-), 
percentage of shares controlled by 
investor pre-acquisition* (-), Net 
working capital/Assets 
Acquirer's post-merger ownership over 
50%*** (+), Opposing suitor*** (+), 
Conglomeration, Contested offer  
  
Varaiya 
(1987) 
  Anti-takeover amendment** (+), 
Target undervaluation* (+) 
Acquisition competition*** (+)   
Slusky & Caves 
(1991) 
Management's 
ownership***(-), 
Individual shareholders 
percentage 
Financial synergy in debt ratio 
difference***(+), Individual 
shareholders percentage***(-) 
Operating fit indicator, Management's 
ownership,  
Presence of biding rivals*** (+), Cash 
payment*** (+) 
S&P 500 
index value 
at the end of 
transaction  
Haunschild 
(1994) 
Interlock partner 
premia*** (+),  
Target uncertainty* (-), Size 
relationship, Adjusted target ROE 
Competing bid* (+), Own Investment 
Banker premia** (+),Other IBanker 
premia, Business synergy, Size synergy 
Year of 
transaction 
Hambrick & 
Hayward 
(1997) 
Recent acquirer 
performance*** (+), 
Media praise for 
CEO***(+), CEO 
relative pay**(+), 
Acquirer liquidity 
Target officer holding** (+),Target's 
relative profitability, Target financial 
synergies, Target poison pill, Relative 
size of target, Combined CEO/chair 
Competing bidders* (+), Payment 
method 
Year of 
transaction 
Billett & 
Ryngaert 
(1997) 
Acquirer’s foothold Target log relative size***(-), 
Liabilities/equity *** (+), Financial 
assets/equity*** (-), Insider 
Multiple bidders*** (+), Percentage of 
shares sought, Poison pill 
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holdings*** (-), Institutional holdings,  
Rossi & Volpin 
(2004) 
 Bidder M/B Shareholder protection ***(+), Target 
size*** (-) 
Cross border transaction* (+), Tender 
offer*** (+), contested bid** (+), 
Mandatory bid rule* (-), Hostile bid 
Target 
country 
Sudarsanam et 
al. (2010) 
    Length of acquisition*** (+), Bid 
Hostility*** (+), Competing 
bidders*** (+)  
  
Fich et al. 
(2013) 
 Private acquirer***(-) Golden parachute measures**(-), 
Size** (-),Liquidity**(+), Prior year 
excess return***(+), CEO near 
retirement*(-), Overconfident CEO, 
CEO-chairman, CEO-founder, CEO’s 
equity ownership, CEO employment, 
Board ownership, Independent 
directors, M/B ratio, Leverage, Free 
cash flow 
Cash payment**(+), Tender offer*** 
(+), Rumor**(+), Prior bidding**(+), 
Target termination fee**(+), Target 
initiated deal***(-), Hostile bid, Same 
industry, Litigation, Toehold, Time to 
completion, One year change in IP 
index 
  
Qiu et al. 
(2014) 
Acquirer size*** (+), 
Acquirer Tobin’s Q*** 
(+), Acquirer ROA, 
Acquirer debt ratio 
Target size*** (-), Target stock 
retention**(-), CEO age, CEO Gender, 
CEO stock, CEO options, Target 
Tobin’s q, Target ROA, Target debt 
ratio, Industry 
CEO retention** (-), Tender offer* (+), 
Friendly attitude* (-) ,Cash deal, Same 
industry 
Year of 
transaction 
Notes: All takeover premia determinants mentioned in the literature review are shown above. The sign in parentheses indicates the direction of the factor’s influence, while the asterisk indicates 
the average (in case of several panels) significance level (* = Statistical significance at the 10% level, ** = Statistical significance at the 5% level, *** = Statistical significance at the 1% level).  
Table 2-1: Summary of bid premia analysis frameworks 
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2.4 Chinese acquisition characteristics  
Most M&A analyses are conducted based on world or American market data. Due to 
the ever-increasing role of Chinese acquirers in world M&A market, especially after 
China’s superior performance in the world economic recession following 2008, more 
and more scholars have started to research on Chinese acquisition characteristics and 
discuss how they may converge, to or diverge from mainstream frameworks in terms 
of motive, context and performance.   
However, due to the difficulty in quantifying factors, most of Chinese acquisistion 
analyses are based on qualitative description and case study methods, instead of 
empirical analysis on Chinese acquisition drivers. One of the most popular 
frameworks applied is the resource-based theory, according to which a firm’s strategic 
assets determine its competitive advantage and performance (Barney, 1991). Through 
multiple case studies, Deng (2007 & 2009), and Rui & Yip (2008) argue that foreign 
acquisition is one of the best means for Chinese firms to acquire strategic assets or 
leverage their competitive advantages under China’s unique institutional environment, 
where the Chinese Government has the political control to reward and discipline firms 
for their adherence to its directives. Moreover, under the economic reforms, the 
Chinese Government has now enforced a series of policies, or even subsidies, to 
encourage Chinese firms to invest abroad and develop international competitive 
advantage. 2  Therefore, both home country institutional constraints and foreign 
investment possibilities motivate Chinese firms to do international M&A transactions.  
Further, He & Lyles (2008) remind that China is still a developing economy, which 
started transitioning from a long-time centrally-planning model to a market-based 
model only around 20 years ago. Though Chinese firms have strong incentives to 
initiate international M&A, their lack of experience may disadvantage their 
international expansion to a large degree. In this paper, they also point out the cultural 
differences that may make Chinese acquisions different. For example, the role of 
                                                             
2 More detailed policies can be found in the public Chinese state council website: http://www.gov.cn/ 
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Government agency partnerships in the market economy remains confusing3; Guanxi 
(relationship) makes transactions more than a simple business deal; Confucianism 
leads to conservativeness in decision making; and the potential for corruption makes 
the deal even more complicated.  
In terms of acquisistion performance, Wu & Xie (2007) find that Chinese acquirers 
mostly conform to mainstream observations in the way that pre-acquisition 
performance and organizational age are positively related with performance, and 
pre-acquisition free cash flow is negatively related; but the special portion of 
state-owned shares in Chinese firms may significantly decrease acquisition 
performance.  
All in all, the existing literature on Chinese acquisitions suggests that Chinese M&A 
activities are mostly in line with mainstream analysis in motives, premia determinants, 
and post-acquisition performance. But Chinese acquirers do have unique intrinsic and 
extrinsic stimuli to make acquisitions, special context of Government involvement, 
reliance in Guanxi (relationship) and conservativeness in country culture, as well as 
lack of experience, which complicate the takeover decision and bid permia 
determinantion. Therefore, I propose the main hypothesis in the thesis: 
Chinese acquirers tend to pay a systematically different premium for their targets. 
 
 
                                                             
3 That is why in Globerman & Shapiro (2009), the authors argue that goals unrelated to wealth maximization may 
dominate in some Chinese MNCs, which enjoy the leeway to make financially unprofitable foreign acquisitions 
and to operate acquired foreign companies inefficiently 
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3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Empirical data  
3.1.1 Data sources 
The analysis in this thesis is mainly based on information from three sources: 
Thomson Router SDC Platinum™, Bloomberg Terminal, and individual transaction 
reports. Since the paper aims to analyze Chinese M&A premia based on worldwide 
comparisons, a trustworthy collection of global M&A transaction data is needed. On 
the one hand, SDC plantium, as one of the most comprehensive M&A databases, has 
been widely used in previous premium analyses. On the other hand, Bloomberg, by 
providing comprehensive and reliable real-time and historical information on 
individual firms and market, perfectly compliments the SDC database. However, for 
more detailed information on specific transactions, other individual transaction reports 
or filings are needed.  
3.1.2 Sample data  
The choice of sample data has to conform to the objective of the analysis. To perform 
better comparisons between takeover premia paid by Chinese acquirers and others, the 
data selection starts with transactions with Chinese acquirers and then extends to 
comparable global acquisitions.  
3.1.2.1 The Chinese M&A transaction dataset  
In the general description of Chinese M&A4 activities, the preliminary dataset is 
based on all M&A transaction data with Chinese acquirers from SDC Platinum since 
December 18, 1978, when the “Chinese economic reform” was officially introduced 
in the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China. 5 Capital markets and international businesses were then open for the first 
                                                             
4 For consistency purpose, in the following context terms of “Chinese acquisition”, “Chinese M&A”, etc. all refer 
to transactions with Chinese acquirers. The definition of “nation of target / acquirer” in this thesis: “the nation in 
which the acquiror's primary business is located at the announcement date of the transaction.” 
5 Before this meeting, especially in the year 1966-1976, Chinese economy was greatly affected by the “Cultural 
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time to the public. The data end on December 31, 2014. There are altogether 33117 
transactions during this time period.6  
3.1.2.2 The worldwide M&A transaction dataset  
Worldwide M&A transaction data mainly serves for comparison purposes with 
Chinese acquisitions. To be more comparable with the Chinese M&A dataset and 
reduce unnecessary noise, I need to set up the worldwide M&A transaction dataset 
following the pattern of Chinese acquisitions. Therefore, the thesis only use: 
1) Transactions announced between January 1st, 2002 and Decemeber 31st, 2014.  
2) Completed or unconditional transactions.7  
3) Transactions with premia data.8 
4) Transactions with adjusted premia lower than 200%.9  
                                                                                                                                                                              
Revolution”, which resisted any form of democracy, including the market-based economy. So it shall be reasonable 
to set this time as the starting point of the analysis.  
6 In the case of more specialized analysis, the Chinese and worldwide M&A transaction datasets specified in this 
session are subject to more adjustments in the following chapters. For example, since the trend analysis reveals 
virtually no Chinese takeovers before 2002, I modify the starting point to the beginning of 2002, which will be 
revealed in the next chapter. 
7 The other types of deal, e.g. intended or withdrawn ones, are by definition not successful, and thus not useful in 
revealing the correct comparison between premia paid.  
8 Unless specified separately, the premium mentioned in this thesis is the “Premium 1 Day Prior to Announcement 
Date”, defined as “Premium of offer price to target closing stock price 1 day prior to the original announcement 
date, expressed as a percentage: 
[ Share Price paid by Acquirer for Target Shares (Host Currency) – Target Share Price 1 day (Host Currency) 
prior to announcement ] / Target Share Price 1 day (Host Currency)” 
9 Regarding the range of premia, many papers suggest the necessity of adjustments. For example, Moeller et al. 
(2005) and Officer (2003) both eliminate the negative premium observations, or make adjustments to make the 
premia within the range 0-200%. In my sample, we also set the upper bound to be 200% because, in the Chinese 
dataset, most transactions with premia over 200% are not correct or have improper treatments, thus needing 
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5) The targets shall not be primarily listed in Chinese mainland stock exchanges 
(i.e. China New OTC Bulletin Board, Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, Shenzhen -SME Board, Shenzhen - ChiNext Market) 
6) Target primary stock exchanges shall be one of the following markets: Hong 
Kong stock exchange, Nasdaq stock exchange, Australian Securities Exchange, 
New York stock exchange, Singapore stock exchange, HK-Stock Exchange 
Growth Enterprise Market, TSX Venture Exchange, Toronto Stock Exchange, 
London Stock Exchange-Alternative Investment Market10. 
In this manner, I gradually limit the worldwide M&A dataset to 9396 observations 
that fit these requirements. 
Restraints Worldwide transactions  Chinese aquisitions  
1) 557218 31667 
1) & 2) 410565 14162 
1), 2) & 3) 26061 1010 
1), 2), 3) & 4) 25755 1003 
1), 2), 3), 4) & 5) 25015 304 
1), 2), 3), 4), 5) & 6) 9396 250 
Data source: SDC Platinum 
Table 3-1: M&A transaction dataset information 
                                                                                                                                                                              
correction (more details can be found in Appendix 2: Correction for Chinese acquisition dataset). Similar problems 
are found with worldwide transaction observations. Moreover, the outlier transactions occupy only 1.17% of 
overall transactions. Therefore, we deem the exclusion appropriate. On the other hand, we do not set the lower 
bound because we deem those transactions useful in providing some other information. Most importantly, the 
negative premia data are always seem to be correct in the database.  
10 The list is generated based on the discussion in the target primary stock exchange session in Chapter 4, and is 
based on the number of transactions. Also considering the fact that Chinese acquisitions happening outside this 
range occupy less than 10% of overall transactions, and they are widely dispersed with less than 10 transactions on 
each exchange, we deem the limitation on stock exchange most useful to reduce the noise of “outlier” transactions.  
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3.2 Methodology 
For premium analysis, various techniques are suggested by scholars, such as weighted 
nonlinear least squares estimation (Billett & Ryngaert, 1997), and option pricing 
theory (Sudarsanam & Sorwar, 2010). However, the mainstream methodology applied 
is the linear regression estimation technique, as in Fich et al. (2013), and Qiu et al. 
(2014), coupled with parametric and non-parametric tests in Moeller et al. (2005), 
Sudarsanam et al. (2010), etc. The thesis will begin with simple parametric and 
non-parametric comparisons of sample means and distributions (the Kolmogorov–
Smirnov test and student’s t-test); afterwards the general-to-specific regression model 
will follow to control for more potential premia determinants simultaneously.   
3.2.1 Non-parametric distribution comparison  
The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (K-S test) was originally designed as one-sample test 
to check the maximum difference between an empirical and a hypothetical cumulative 
distribution (Massey & Jr., 1951). Thereafter, the two-sample test was developped to 
compare the empirical distribution functions of two samples. The biggest advantage 
of K-S test is that the statistics do not assume sample disctributions, and it has become 
one of the most useful and general non-parametric methods for comparing one sample 
to a probability distribution or comparing two samples. 
Therefore, I utilize the two-sample K-S test to check whether the distribution of 
premia paid by Chinese and non-Chinese acquirers significantly differ from one 
another.   
3.2.2 Parametric mean value comparison  
The non-parametric K-S test examines the general difference between Chinese and 
non-Chinese acquisition premia distributions. In the general comparison of premia 
values, the assumption of a probability distribution is often needed; thus parametric 
tests, such as t-test or Chi-test, are widely used in the literature.  
Looking at the historical premia probability distributions (Figure 5-2), and 
considering the huge sample size, the premia measure approximate the normal 
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distribution, so the t-test might then be useful in the comparison of mean values of the 
two samples. Moreover, the differences in kurtosis of the historical distributions seem 
to reveal differences in variances, so I will utilize students’s two-sample t-test with 
unequal variances to examine whether the average bid premia paid by Chinese and 
non-Chinese acquirers are significantly different.  
3.2.3 General-to-specific regression model  
Both the t-test and the K–S test merely test the equality of overall bid premia without 
controlling for other effects. The situation is much more complicated in reality. For 
example, it might be the case that premia are higher in some specific areas, from 
which Chinese observations are disproportionally drawn. Thus I use regression 
modeling to allow for the influence of multiple explanatory variables, while 
quantifying the relationship between bid premia and acquirer nationalities. More 
specifically, the modified general-to-specific regression technique (Efroymson, 1960, 
Wilkinson, 1979) is applied.  
1. The model starts with all candidate variables, including stock exchange, target 
country, time, acquirer/target industry factors and control variables for other 
acquirer, target and deal characteristics; 
2. Before reducing variables, the severity of multicollinearity is quantified via 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF); 
3. At each step, in balancing the muticollinearity problem and significance level 
of each coefficient, less usful explanatory variables are removed from the 
model.  
4. The process continues until only statistically significant variables remain and 
no further improvements can be made. 
Throughout the process, potential premia determinants are all considered and the most 
powerful explanations are identified.  
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4 General description of Chinese M&A activities 
4.1 The time trend of Chinese M&A transactions 
As noted in the literature review, worldwide M&A transactions follow growth waves. 
A similar pattern can be observed in Chinese acquisition activity as well. Based on the 
dataset specified in Session 3.1.2.1, I plot the time trend to describe Chinese M&A 
development and identify four main increases in Chinese M&A transactions over 37 
years. 
  Data source: SDC Platinum  
Figure 4-1: Chinese M&A transactions over time 
Chinese acqusition activity literally initiated in the 1980s, coinciding with the Chinese 
Government’s termination of the internal conflict with Lin Biao11, the proposed “Five 
Principles” for international cooperation, and the “One country, two systems” plan12 
                                                             
11 Biao Lin was among Mr. Mao’s best partners in fighting against enemies in his early life, but due to the conflict 
with Mr. Mao after the independence of People's Republic of China, he was condemned as a traitor by the 
Communist Party of China and was labeled as the "counter-revolutionary forces" of the Cultural Revolution.  
12 “One country, two systems” was originally proposed by Deng Xiaoping. It insisted on the principal that there 
would be only one China, but allowed distinct Chinese regions such as Hong Kong and Macau to retain their own 
capitalist economic and political systems, while the rest of China continued with the socialist system. 
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for Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan economies. Therefore, the Chinese government 
allowed more international transactions and capital market mobility, and companies 
could have more opportunities to take control of other firms. 
Growth increased by the 1990s, perhaps it was connected with the change in world 
politics. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992 signified the termination of the 
global bipolar structure. In only one year, China established diplomatic relations with 
13 more countries and moved much closer to the world economy. Therefore, Chinese 
M&A activity was enhanced.  
The next growth period began in the 2000s. This trend may have something to do with 
China’s officially join to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11th 
2001. Thereafter, the international trade relations with other members became more 
frequent, as did M&A transactions.  
After a temporary peak in 2004, from 2005 onwards Chinese M&A transactions 
became even more active. This may be explained by the technological innovation and 
Chinese economy boost. Moreover, on July 21st, 2004 China terminated the pegged 
exchange rate currency against the US dollars, and the increasing purchasing power of 
the Chinese yuan might explain the increasing trend as well. More interestingly, in 
contrast with the global recession, Chinese acquisition volume reached one peak 
around 2008. This may be due to the imperfect capital market mobility and the 
Economic Stimulus Program13 initiated on November 9th, 2008. 
All in all, Chinese M&A activity exihibits similar time trends as global merger waves. 
However, since only 4.39% of transactions occurred before 2002, it is reasonable to 
focus on Chinese M&A transactions since 2002 to reduce noise in the comparisons. 
                                                             
13 The Chinese economic stimulus plan contained a RMB¥ 4 trillion (US$ 586 billion) stimulus package in an 
attempt to minimize the impact of the global financial crisis on the Chinese economy and to stabilize the world 
economy. As a result, the World Bank raised its growth forecast in China for 2009 from 6.5% to 7.2%. 
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4.2 The target/acquirer industry 
As stated in Harford (2005), industry shocks are among the primary reasons for 
merger waves. Therefore, I would like to further consider the concentrations in 
target/acquirer industries. By limiting the acquisition year, I cut the observation size to 
31664 transactions, and sketch the following discription.  
4.2.1 Target industry  
Data source: SDC Platinum 
Figure 4-2: Chinese M&A transactions across target industry  
As illustrated in this figure, Chinese acquirers take over targets in all the 61 industries 
defined in the SDC database, and the preference declines gradually from Real Estate; 
Mortgage Bankers and Brokers (3076 transactions) to Legal Service (5 observations).  
To generalize, Chinese firms are more likely to acquire firms in intermediate service 
industries, such as brokers and dealers, as well as heavy industry, such as Equipment 
and Mining. This phenomenon coincides with the Chinese Government’s policy to 
“persist in taking economic development as the central task”, as these industries are 
exactly the ones that bring in money most quickly. Moreover, the Chinese 
Government’s intent to build international reputation by investing heavily in 
developing countries in recent years may also play a role in defining the distribution.  
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4.2.2 Acquirer industry  
 
  Data source: SDC Platinum 
Figure 4-3: Chinese M&A transactions across acquirer industry  
In contrast with the target industry distribution, the pattern of acquirer industry is 
quite different. A large portion of the deals (over 26%) were actually completed by 
investment firms14. This phenomenon may be explained by the fact that, compared to 
other Chinese firms, these financial intermediaries are more familiar with takeover 
operations, and they are more likely to have business connections with potential 
targets. Moreover, it might be the case that the ultimate acquirers merely conducted 
the acquisition in the name of these financial intermediaries.  
In light of the industry distributions of acquirers and targets, I infer that Chinese 
acquirers prefer the service industries and the heavy industries, while intermediaries 
such as investment firms, take the leading role in conducting these acquisitions.  
                                                             
14 The definition of “Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges” provided by the SDC Platinum:   
“This major group includes establishments engaged in the underwriting, purchase, sale, or brokerage of securities 
and other financial contracts on their own account or for the account of others; and exchanges, exchange 
clearinghouses, and other services allied with the exchange of securities and commodities.” 
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4.3 The target country/region15  
In the field of M&A, many papers have considered target country-specifc effects by 
both quantitative analysis of cross-country transaction determinants (Rossi & Volpin, 
2004), and qualitative description of strategic and cultural integration (Rui & Yip, 
2008). However, these papers commonly take a North American perspective, so I 
would like to throw light on the target regions of Chinese acquisitions.  
      Data source: SDC Platinum 
Figure 4-4: Chinese M&A transactions across target country/region  
As this figure indicates, the most popular targets of Chinese acquirers are primarily 
operated in China, with a massively dominant share of overall transactions. The next 
most popular target regions are Hong Kong, the United States, Australia, Canada, 
                                                             
15 Since Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan follow a different social system from the Chinese mainland, and the 
capital market requirements are quite different, I talk the transactions between firms from the Chinese mainland 
and Hong Kong as cross-border transactions.  
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Singapore, and so on. 
This pattern may be connected to Chinese culture, especially in concepts of “Guanxi” 
and Confucianism, which ultimately makes Chinese firms more likely to acquire the 
related targets, and those with the same or similar cultural backgrounds. Therefore, 
domestic companies, or firms in nearby regions affected by these Chinese cultures, 
become popular targets. Moreover, the world’s big economies, such as the US and 
Canada, also have close business connections with Chinese firms and comprise a 
relatively big component as target countries.   
On the other hand, the relatively low popularity of Japan, the world’s third largest 
economy located next to China, may be explained by the historically tense 
relationship with China. However, as put into the pilar of “others”, target countries 
after Nigeria only have less than 10 M&A transactions, summing to less than 0.8% of 
overall transaction volume.  
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4.4 The target primary stock exchange 
The target country distribution presents a preliminary picture of where the targets are 
located. However, for a better view of where targets are traded and how they are 
affected by specific market changes or regulations, I will further the discussion to 
target primary stock exchange.   
 
    Data source: SDC Platinum 
Figure 4-5: Chinese M&A transactions across target primary stock exchange  
As this figure indicates, the majority of transactions are actually acquiring private 
firms, and public targets are mostly traded in the Chinese mainland or Hong Kong 
stock exchanges, followed by stock exchanges in the US, Australia, Singapore and 
Canada. In further research on these specific stock exchanges, I note out the following 
details that may potentially complicate the analysis. 
4.4.1 Private targets  
As the figure shows, the majority of targets are private. This makes sense because big 
corporations are limited in organic growth, whilst SMEs (the most representative type 
of private firm) are born quickly due to technological innovation and greatly need 
capital to grow. Therefore, the combination of MNCs and SMEs becomes beneficial 
for both sides. However, those private targets are not required to submit financial 
statements or annual reports, so it is impossible to get the information needed for 
premia analysis.  
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4.4.2 Chinese mainland stock exchanges 
Most targets of Chinese M&A are listed on stock exchanges in the Chinese mainland. 
However, Chinese capital is not perfectly mobile. Therefore, one of the biggest 
challenges for bid premia analysis for targets listed in the Chinese mainland is the fact 
that Chinese listed companies usually have two classes of share: Class A, traded on 
the exchange; and Class B, representing big blocks of shares, which are not allowed to 
be traded by individuals.  
Class A shares are traded only in segmented mainland stock exchanges, which do not 
have foreign investors. At the same time, domestic investors cannot invest directly in 
foreign stock markets. The special arrangement actually makes the observed (Class A) 
stock price extremely high, given the huge population and limited investment 
possibilities.  
However, in M&A transactions, acquirers also have to bid for the Class B shares, for 
which they have to get permission to bid and which will be based on the “true” 
underlying value, which is much lower than the price of the Class A shares trading in 
the market.  
Therefore, the bid premia for targets listed in the Chinese mainland stock exchanges 
may appear artificially and extremely low. For example, when Dongguan Yingfeng 
Oil Cake Ind acquired Chengdu Book Digital Co Ltd, it paid a premium of -96.72%. 
The bid price is based on the audited net assets value per share, which represents the 
true value of Class B and is much lower than the stock price observed for Class A 
shares in the stock exchange.  
Hence I exclude Chinese M&A transactions with target companies listed in all 
Chinese mainland stock exchanges: China New OTC Bulletin Board, Shanghai Stock 
Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange ChiNext Board, and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange SME Board.  
27 
 
4.4.3 Other stock exchanges 
Outside the Chinese mainland, there are 69 stock exchanges where the targets are 
primarily listed. They are dispersed all over the world, including Europe, America, 
Asia and Africa. However, transactions concentrate in only a few stock exchanges. If I 
set the cut line to be 24 transactions over the analysis period1617, and compare the 
number of transactions with overall transactions in each stock market, I construct the 
Chinese acquisition target listing exchange information table, which is given in 
Appendix 1. Moreover, I draw the following figure to illustrate the relative number of 
Chinese acquisitions that happened in each major stock exchange in each year.  
 
Data source: SDC Platnium 
Figure 4-6: Percentage of Chinese M&A transactions in each stock exchange 
 
                                                             
16 There are two reasons to choose 24. First, there is a gap from 24 down to 16 in the sample. Second, since there 
are 13 years in the period, we believe at least 24 transactions are needed to make sense of comparisons with other 
transactions in the exchanges.   
17 According to the dataset, there were also 65 transactions in the OTC market, which is defined as the aggregated 
OTC markets not specified in SDC database. Though the transaction volume is over 24, individual markets are 
unknown and not observable, so we have to exclude then.  
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As revealed in the data, targets are mostly traded in the mainstream stock exchanges, 
especially in Hong Kong, the US and Australia, and Chinese acquirers have become 
more and more active in each stock exchange in both absolute and relative terms. 
Before the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese M&A occupied less than 10% of overall 
transactions in the 9 stock exchanges (detailed percentages can be found in Appendix 
1). This is partly because 2008 financial crisis signified the termination of the sixth 
global merger wave. At the same time, the imperfect capital mobility in Chinese 
financial markets and the Economic Stimulus Program, protected Chinese firms from 
the global financial crisis. So they were then ready to take over companies hammered 
by the crisis.  
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5 Comparison of Chinese and non-Chinese bid premia  
5.1 Choice of premia proxy and target dataset 
By definition, bid premium refers to the above-market-price component which 
bidders offer to target firm shareholders. Before the actual comparison between 
premia paid by Chinese and non-Chinese acquirers, some considerations still need to 
be made, such as the choice of premia proxy and target dataset. 
5.1.1 Choice of premia data 
The SDC database provides three potential takeover premia proxies: "Offer Price to 
Target Stock Price Premium 1 Day Prior to Announcement","Offer Price to Target 
Stock Price Premium 1 Week Prior to Announcement", and"Offer Price to Target 
Stock Price Premium 4 Weeks Prior to Announcement". Each premium variable has its 
own properties, so the choice of premia data is of great concern. Based on the tailored 
worldwide dataset specified in 3.1.3.2, I first compare how the three premia proxies 
differ in historical distribution.  
 
  Data source: SDC platinum 
Figure 5-1: Premium proxy comparison  
As this figure shows, the premium data based on target share price 1 day, 1 week and 
4 weeks before announcement exihibit quite different distributions. Especially in the 
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aspect of kurtosis, the premium distribution is more flat as the time length increases. 
This property has its economic implication in the choice of premium variable since 
the actual premium differences are likely to stand out if a shorter time length is 
applied. Otherwise the time-smoothing effects may partially wipe out the difference18. 
Moreover, comparing the means these three premia proxies, the value based on longer 
time gap is significantly larger than that of the shorter time length. This phenomenon 
may be caused by the market return during the premia calculation gap. The longer the 
gap, the higer the market return is embeded in the premia proxy value.  
Therefore, to get rid of the time-smoothing effects on premium data and reduce the 
“noise” of market return in premia value, I will only use the 1 day based premium 
data for the further analysis.  
5.1.2 Choice of target set  
After the choice of premium data to use, another important issue is the choice of the 
target set, especially in terms of whether to include the premia paid to domestic 
targets in the Chinese acquisition dataset.  
Historically, papers relating to Chinese M&A mostly concern cross-border 
transactions, such as Deng (2009) and Wu & Xie (2007). I also find extraordinary 
treatment of the targets listed on Chinese mainland stock exchanges. However, in 
further consideration of potential consequence by omiting domestic transactions, I 
believe M&A transactions with Chinese targets need to be included in the comparison, 
but need proper adjustments.    
First of all, in the global M&A dataset, domestic acquisitions in non-Chinese markets 
are considered and represent an essential component. Moreover, researchers such as 
Rossi & Volpin (2004), already show significant premia effects of acquisitions being 
                                                             
18 Probably this is also one of the reasons why Asplund & Kjellesvik (2012) find no significant difference in 
Chinese and non-Chinese bid premia. 
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cross-border19. Therefore, if domestic transactions are excluded merely from the 
Chinese acquisition set, the the comparison is biased. 
However, necessary adjustments still need to be done eo ensure a reliable comparison. 
To get rid of the extraordinary treatments of Chinese stock markets, I exclude 
observations (either domestic or cross-border) with targets listed on Chinese stock 
exchanges. While I deem Chinese companies listed in non-Chinese mainland stock 
exchanges subject to similar regulation to other targets and thus comparable to the 
global M&A set.  
Therefore, I will use both domestic and outbound M&A data of Chinese acquisitions 
while exluding targets listed on the Chinese mainland exchanges for the general 
comparison and regression analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 Actually, similar effect of cross-border transactions in takeover premium is found in this thesis as well, see the 
Session 7.1 for more details.  
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5.2 General comparison  
Based on the chosen premia proxy and target dataset, I firstly compare the bid premia 
paid by Chinese and non-Chinese acquirers to test the main hypothesis whether 
“Chinese acquirers do pay a systematically different premium for their target” from a 
general sense, before going on further explanations. 
 
 Data source: SDC platinum 
Figure 5-2: General acquisition premia comparison 
As the figure shows, premia paid by Chinese acquirers are typically in the range -20% 
to +50%, with a concentration between -5% and +15%. The historical premia 
distribution also displays positive skewness, indicating that Chinese acquirers are 
more likely to pay small but positive premia for targets. Compared to Chinese 
acquirers, the historical bid premia distribution of non-Chinese acquirers also has its 
mean value around zero but the dispersion much lower. Moreover, it is clear that 
Chinese acquisitions only represent a small portion of global M&A transactions, thus 
the premia distribution of overall transactions and non-Chinese one almost overlap 
with each other.  
The virtual observation only gives certain indication on the premia differential. To be 
more precise in comparison, I then apply both the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
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equality-of-distributions test (non-parametric) and the two-sample t-test with unpaired 
variances (parametric) to reveal the premia distribution and the mean value 
differences. In line with the main hypothesis, both tests prove highly significant 
differences (𝑝<1%) between Chinese acquirer and non-Chinese acquirer premia data, 
and on average, Chinese acquirers pay 15% less than other acquirers.  
However, in further research on the underlying reasons, I suspect that the comparison 
may be subject to dataset selection problems. That is, Chinese acquirers may pay 
higer premia for targets operating in certain markets or industries, while in other 
markets or industries, premia paid by Chinese acquirers are disproportionally lower. 
To control for these potential selection problems, five sub-hypotheses are proposed.  
1) Target primary listing stock exchange-specific factors explain the Chinese 
takeover premia difference; 
2) Target primary business location region-specific factors explain the Chinese 
takeover premia difference; 
3) Time-specific factors explain the Chinese takeover premia difference; 
4) Target industry-specific factors explain the Chinese takeover premia 
difference; 
5) Acquirer industry-specific factors explain the Chinese takeover premia 
difference. 
Following these five sub-hypotheses, I then compare premia paid in the similar 
fashion from each of the sub-aspects, thus complimenting the main hypothesis.  
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5.3 Stock exchange-specific effects 
Companies listed in different stock exchanges are subject to different regulations and 
market environments. Therefore, target listing stock exchange-specific factors may 
cause variations in both the ease and premia of M&A transactions. Considering the 
high concentration of Chinese M&A in several particular exchanges, I will first 
compare Chinese and non-Chinese acquisitions across the nine major stock exchanges 
specified in Chapter 4 (see Figure 5-3 on next page).  
The comparisons show trends similar to the global comparison, while exhibiting a 
couple of different characteristics. All acquirers tend to pay premia within a small 
range around zero; Chinese M&A activities only represent a small portion of overall 
transactions in all the stock exchanges listed in the figure; and Chinese historical 
premia are more dispersed than others. At the meantime, different stock exchanges do 
exhibit differences in distribution patterns. For example, stock markets in Hong Kong 
have more M&A transactions with a negative premium; and takeover premia in 
Singapore and the London- AIM market tend to be more widely distributed, instead of 
concentrating on certain stock exchanges. These differences may potentially be 
explained by the segmented stock market shocks or specific stock exchange 
regulations20.  
Moreover, based on the unequalled premia distributions of Chinese and non-Chinese 
acquirers’ premia in the figure, Chinese acquirers seem more likely to pay more for 
targets listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, Singapore stock exchange, TSX 
Venture exchange and Toronto stock exchange, while paying less on the New York 
stock exchange and the NASDAQ exchange. By applying both the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and t-test to compare transactions in these stock exchanges, 
the results are generated in the Table 5-1.
                                                             
20 For example, within Canada the TSX Venture exchange is designated for emerging companies, while the 
Toronto Stock Exchange is the senior equity market, the different treatments to companies of different seniorities 
may cause differences in the M&A premia. 
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 Data source: SDC Platinum 
Figure 5-3: Premia comparison across stock markets 
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Stock exchange Two-sample K-S test Two-sample t-test 
Hong Kong 
0.1004  
(0.400) 
-2.9640  
(-0.6669) 
NASDAQ 
0.4098  
(0.000)*** 
-37.2161  
(-2.7652)*** 
Australia 
0.1946  
(0.031)** 
4.0048  
(0.8581) 
New York 
0.4986  
(0.000)*** 
-48.4702  
(-4.1530)*** 
Singapore 
0.1262 
(0.910) 
-4.6177  
(-0.6457) 
HK GEM 
0.2182  
(0.708) 
-10.0148  
(-0.7468) 
TSX Venture 
0.4156  
(0.006)*** 
40.5942  
(3.7505)*** 
Toronto 
0.2085  
(0.473) 
0.5140  
(0.0513) 
London- AIM 
0.3961  
(0.274) 
-32.5752  
(-1.6377) 
Notes: The table lists the two equality tests results. Under the K-S test column The numbers refer to the difference 
in distribution parameters defined in STATA, while the numbers in parentheses refer to the p-values under K-S test. 
Under t-test column, the number is the excess of Chinese acquisition premia over non-Chinese, while the numbers 
in parentheses are the t-values. Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table 5-1: Premia comparison across stock markets 
The table shows clearly stock exchange-specific influences. Chinese acquirers pay 
more than non-Chinese for targets on the TSX Venture, while paying less for targets 
on the New York and NASDAQ markets. In other stock markets, the dataset fails to 
provide a conclusive result. Especially in Australia Stock Exchange, even though the 
dataset suggest highly significant different distributions for Chinese and non-Chinese 
acquirer premia, the difference between mean values is not significant.  
Moreover, combining the results with the target listing stock exchange information in 
Appendix 1, it is easy to notice that Chinese takeovers occur disproportionally in 
Hong Kong and Australia, where Chinese acquirers pay marginally less than 
non-Chinese firms (though not significantly so). Therefore, I suspect that the targets’ 
concentration in lower premia stock exchanges is the primary reason for the average 
premia difference, so I calculate both Chinese and global average bid premia in each 
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stock exchange and make the following table.  
Variable 
Percentage of 
overall  
acquisitions 
Percentage of 
Chinese 
acquisitions 
Chinese 
M&A 
premia 
Overall 
M&A 
premia 
Difference 
(1) (2) (1)-(2) 
Premium 100% 100.00% 1.8547 16.8545 -14.9998 
 Stock exchange concentration 
HK GEM 1.87% 3.60% -16.5067 -6.8567 -9.6500 
Hong Kong 9.36% 32.00% -5.5286 -2.8216 -2.7070 
Singapore 4.96% 7.20% 6.5878 11.0534 -4.4656 
Australia 17.18% 20.80% 16.5021 12.6420 3.8601 
New York 13.50% 8.80% -30.7973 16.8339 -47.6312 
London AIM 5.53% 2.00% -13.2740 19.0852 -32.3592 
Toronto 10.23% 5.60% 21.1443 20.6350 0.5093 
Nasdaq 27.04% 14.00% -9.6483 26.8821 -36.5304 
TSX Venture  10.33% 6.00% 57.5607 17.5935 39.9671 
Note: The table summarizes Chinese M&A concentration in target stock exchanges and the bid premia comparison 
with the average level in each stock exchange. The order is sorted by the overall premia paid (from smallest to 
largest). The red colorred cells refer to the scenarios where the average premia are lower than the general average. 
Table 5-2: Chinese M&A concentration in stock exchanges 
The table reveals clearly both Chinese M&A concentration in low premia contexts 
and the tendency to pay lower premia in most stock exchanges. Both effects 
contribute to the lower average premia paid by Chinese acquirers.  
The findings have their own rationales. In general, Asian mind-set is more 
conservative compared to western cultures. The relative importance of relationship in 
Asian culture also bring down the premia to pay. On contrary, US or Canada markets 
are more profit/economic based, thus higher premia are required to win the bid. 
Therefore, the Chinese takeover premia differ systematically from the non-Chineses, 
with both concentration in low premia context and tendency to pay lower premia.  
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5.4 Target region-specific effects 
The target listing exchanges convey stock market-specific information, such as stock 
market shocks or exchange specific regulations. But a target’s primary business 
location is not necessarily in the same country as its stock listing, so the country of 
buiness may also play a role in the acquisition premium as well. Thhis is in line with 
much previous research on the geographic effects on bid premia (Rossi & Volpin, 
2004). Also, considering the fact that most Chinese acquisition targets are focused on 
a limited set of countries, the comparison need consider country-specific effects as 
well.  
For a descriptive purpose, I select the eight main target countries, based on transaction 
volume21 (China, Hong Kong, Australia, Canada, Singapore, United States, United 
Kingdom and Japan), and compare the premia paid for targets from each country.  
                                                             
21 The eight most popular target countries are selected based on the number of transactions, due to the huge gap 
between the number of transactions in the eighth favorite country and the ninth. Moreover, we deem fewer than 10 
available Chinese M&A transaction premia per country insufficient to make a meaningful comparison.   
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Data source: SDC Platinum  
Figure 5-4: Premia comparison across target regions 
From the figure, similar results to the comparison across stock exchanges can be 
observed. In most target countries, M&A transactions with Chinese acquirers are only 
a small portion of overall transactions; most target country premia are positively 
skewed; and Chinese acquirers’ premia are historically more widely distributed than 
the rest. Moreover, Chinese acquirers may pay higher premia for targets from Hong 
Kong, Australia, Canadia, the UK and the US, but lower premia in China, Singapore 
and Japan.  
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More interestingly, China as a target country stands out in the comparison. Except for 
targets from China, Chinese acquirers tend to pay more dispersed premia than 
non-Chinese acquirers in all the other seven countries. This may be potentially 
explained by the superiority of domestic M&A concerning the ease of operation, 
information accessibility, cultural similarity, etc, which makes Chinese targets more 
likely to be acquired by Chinese acquirers, causing the premia distribution to be more 
tightly clustered. Meanwhile, the limited information on Chinese firm operations, 
special circumstance of each acquirer country, and relatively low transaction volume 
cause the high dispersion in premia paid by non-Chinese acquirers (even though the 
targets are traded in stock exchanges outside the Chinese mainland).  
As with the stock exchange-based comparison, I also apply both equality tests for 
premia comparison and extract the information of Chinese acquisition concentration 
in target countries. The results are shown below.  
Target country Two-sample K-S test Two-sample t-test 
China 
0.2959  
(0.000)** 
-19.2945 
(-3.3724)*** 
Hong Kong 
0.1226   
(0.363) 
1.1334  
(0.2084) 
Australia 
0.1855  
(0.054)* 
4.4146  
(0.9118) 
Canada 
0.2424  
(0.045)** 
21.4853  
(2.9559)** 
Singapore 
0.3590  
(0.392) 
-8.1060  
(-0.6069) 
United States 
0.2850 
( 0.122) 
-1.4464  
(1.0932) 
United Kingdom 
0.2796  
(0.718) 
-18.2439  
(-0.9235) 
Japan 
0.5767  
(0.000)*** 
-19.5855  
(-2.5666)** 
Notes: The table lists the two equality tests results. Under K-S test column The numbers refer to the difference in 
distribution parameters defined in STATA, while the numbers in parentheses refer to the p-values under K-S test. 
Under t-test column, the number is the excess of Chinese acquisition premia over non-Chinese, while the numbers 
in parentheses are the t-values. Significance level: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Table 5-3: Premia comparison across target regions 
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Variable 
Percentage of 
overall  
acquisitions 
Percentage of 
Chinese 
acquisitions 
Chinese 
M&A 
premia 
Overall 
M&A 
premia 
Difference 
(1) (2) (1)-(2) 
Premium 100% 100.00% 1.8547 16.8545 -14.9998 
 Target country concentration 
China 2.22% 38.40% -17.5004 -7.0239 -10.4765 
Hong Kong 10.53% 21.60% -1.7828 -2.8438 1.0610 
Singapore 4.47% 2.00% 3.8640 11.8788 -8.0148 
Australia 17.03% 19.60% 17.1486 12.8882 4.2604 
Canada 19.92% 11.60% 39.9803 18.8444 21.1359 
United Kingdom 5.00% 2.00% 0.9840 19.1814 -18.1974 
United States 37.74% 4.00% 23.4530 24.9146 -1.4616 
Note: The table summarizes Chinese M&A concentration in target regions and the bid premia comparison with the 
average level in each target country. The order is sorted by the overall premia paid (from smallest to largest). The 
red colorred cells refer to the scenarios where the average premia are lower than the general average. 
Table 5-4: Chinese M&A concentration in target regions 
The tests and the comparison show similar results to those in the previous session. 
Especially for targets from Australia and Singapore, the results are almost the same. 
This can be explained by the fact that the majority of firms with primary business 
within these countries are also primarily listed in these domestic stock exchanges. On 
contrary, the results of the US-located targets and the US-traded targets reveal huge 
divergences. One explanation may be that, due to high liquidity and regulatory 
advantages, US stock markets are also the primarily listing markets of many 
international companies. For example, excluding those listed on Chinese mainland 
stock exchanges, over 28% of Chinese targets are listed primarily on the US stock 
markets. The divergence of the geographical and stock exchange-based country then 
causes the difference.  
Similar concentration in targest countries applies to that in stock exchanges as well. 
The Chinese acquisitions are disproportionately focused in China and Hong Kong, 
where Chinese targets typically earn a low premium, and Chinese acquirers also tend 
to pay lower premia in most target countries. 
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5.5 Time-specific effects 
As the time trend analysis in the general description suggests, the number of 
acquisitions initiated by Chinese acquirers fluctuates a lot following Government 
policies or external environmental changes. Especially in the recent M&A waves, in 
the 2010s, the M&A transaction volume each year has been increasing dramatically. 
Therefore, time fixed effects capturing Government policies and business cycle 
differences, may help explain whether Chinese acquirers actually pay lower premia. 
The following graphs reveal the development of the relationship between the average 
premium paid by Chinese acquirers, non-Chinese acquirers and overall transactions.  
 
   Data source: SDC Platinum 
Figure 5-5: Premia comparison over time  
It is clear that historically Chinese acquirers paid lower average premia than 
non-Chinese in most years; and the premia fluctuations exibit perfect fit with the 
timing of “waves” in Figure 4-1. Espeially in 2004, 2008 and 2011, Chinese M&A 
activity reached its peaks in the sub-waves, and the average premia incrased up to or 
above the world average. Nevertheless, if the transaction concentration over time is 
given, there appear variations from the results of stock exchange and target 
country-based comparison.  
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Variable 
Percentage of 
overall  
acquisitions 
Percentage of 
Chinese 
acquisitions 
Chinese 
M&A 
premia 
Overall 
M&A 
premia 
Difference 
(1) (2) (1)-(2) 
Premium 100% 100.00% 1.8547 16.8545 -14.9998 
 Time concentration 
2003 10.27% 1.20% 3.1733 15.5489 -12.3756 
2004 6.62% 4.80% -4.1933 7.7152 -11.9085 
2005 9.64% 2.40% 5.7533 16.3632 -10.6099 
2006 9.73% 1.20% -7.7133 16.94 -24.6533 
2007 7.31% 3.20% -9.67 14.7806 -24.4506 
2008 7.27% 9.60% 20.1613 20.2436 -0.0824 
2009 8.57% 12.40% 4.8265 15.1862 -10.3598 
2010 7.64% 11.20% 8.7632 19.0621 -10.2988 
2011 5.66% 12.00% 24.653 20.9767 3.6763 
2012 5.68% 14.00% 8.8966 21.9601 -13.0635 
2013 8.67% 12.00% -14.39 17.7436 -32.1336 
2014 7.08% 14.00% -15.5526 13.9888 -29.5413 
Note: The table summarizes Chinese M&A concentration over time and the bid premia comparison with the 
average level in each transaction year. The red colorred cells refer to the scenarios where the average premia are 
lower than the general average. 
Table 5-5: Chinese M&A concentration over time 
Quite different from stock exchange/ country-based comparsion, most Chinese 
acquisitions occurred after 2008, when mostly higher-than-average are paid. This is in 
line with the Chinese “merger wave” discussion in Chapter 4 in the way that the 
world economy is hammerd by the financial crisis and firms are often undervalued, 
thus the premia are higher than usual. More interestingly, Chinese acquirers still 
managed to pay a lower than average premia in most years. Especially in the last 3 
years, around 40% of all Chinese acquisitions occurred with significant lower- than- 
average premia paid.  
To summarize, with the mismatch between growth patterns of average premia paid by 
Chinese and non-Chinese acquirers, time-specific effects may play a role in 
constructing the premia differential.  
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5.6 Acquirer/Target industry-specific effects 
As revealed in the general description, Chinese acquirers crowd into a limited number 
of industries, while their targets are widely distributed across different industries. 
Since different industries have their own operations, investments and regulations, I 
suspect that industry particularities may help explain the premia differenctial. Many 
empirical analyses yield similar effects as well, such as those arising from the industry 
shocks (Harford, 2005). So I select the 26 most popular target industries and 20 most 
popular acquirer industries for further comparison 22 , and draw the following 
comparison (order of industries in the figure is based on the popularity of Chinese 
acquirers).  
                                                             
22 Here the selection is based on the availability of useful data and we set the cutline to be at least five available 
transaction premia for each industry. The cutline is set to capture the most possible industry specific factors and 
ensure the comparison is reliable. Moreover, the unselected industries represent less than 10% of overall 
transactions, so we deem the cutline reasonable and useful. 
 
45 
 
 
   Data source: SDC Platinum 
Figure 5-6: Premia comparison across industry 
From this figure, industry-specific factors affecting both Chinese and non-Chinese 
acquirers’ premia can be identified. On the one hand, Chinese acquirers from certain 
industries, such as investment holding firms and business service, are paying lower 
premia than non-Chinese acquirers. On the other hand, higher bid premia are often 
paid to by Chinese acquirers from oil and gas, and holding companies (except banks). 
Similar industry specificities in premia paid apply to targets of certain industries as 
well.  
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More interestingly, the extreme overlap between the non-Chinese line and the overall 
line indicates the extremely limited proportion of transactions with Chinese acquirers 
globally. Even so, for targets in some specific industries, such as advertising services, 
premia paid by Chinese acquirers are so different that the overall transaction premia 
are heavily affected. 
Apart from the bid premia comparison within each industry, the Chinese acquisition 
concentrations in acquirer/target industries, are summarized in the following table.  
Variable 
Percentage of 
overall  
acquisitions 
Percentage of 
Chinese 
acquisitions 
Chinese 
M&A 
premia 
Overall 
M&A 
premia 
Difference 
(1) (2) (1)-(2) 
Premium 100% 100.00% 1.8547 16.8545 -14.9998 
 Acquirer industry concentration 
Air transportation and shipping 0.22% 0.40% 6.6700 8.1414 -1.4714 
Investment & commodity firms, dealers, 
exchanges 
36.80% 48.80% -8.0740 8.2458 -16.3198 
Holding companies, except banks 1.06% 2.40% 56.8817 9.6098 47.2719 
Real estate; mortgage bankers and 
brokers 
1.39% 2.00% 6.7460 13.1209 -6.3749 
Electric, gas, and water distribution) 1.45% 2.00% -9.7180 14.3769 -24.0949 
Transportation equipment 0.53% 1.60% -4.7225 18.3558 -23.0783 
Textile and apparel products 0.32% 1.20% 8.0600 18.9347 -10.8747 
Metal and metal products 1.69% 5.20% 13.1169 19.0470 -5.9301 
Oil and gas; petroleum refining 5.17% 4.00% 25.3350 19.8951 5.4399 
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 0.30% 0.80% -27.0200 19.9736 -46.9936 
Commercial banks, bank holding 
companies 
4.70% 1.60% 11.2950 20.3953 -9.1003 
Business services 4.73% 6.00% -5.1280 20.3969 -25.5249 
Mining 9.67% 8.40% 25.2490 21.5947 3.6544 
Construction firms 0.61% 0.40% 0.0100 22.4681 -22.4581 
Food and kindred products 1.22% 2.00% 11.9700 22.6975 -10.7275 
Machinery 0.99% 1.60% -10.9675 24.4219 -35.3894 
Wholesale trade-durable goods 1.10% 0.80% 16.7550 24.9664 -8.2114 
Electronic and electrical equipment 2.29% 3.60% -8.4767 27.2168 -35.6935 
Prepackaged software 2.75% 1.20% 11.1333 33.4804 -22.3471 
Drugs 2.96% 0.80% 1.4950 37.3743 -35.8793 
 Target industry concentration 
Textile and apparel products 0.79% 2.00% -7.3000 4.9558 -12.2558 
Wholesale trade-nondurable goods 0.79% 1.20% 5.4867 5.5081 -0.0214 
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Transportation equipment 0.66% 2.00% -31.5240 7.3235 -38.8475 
Electric, gas, and water distribution 1.82% 4.00% -7.4300 7.8583 -15.2883 
Transportation and shipping (except air) 1.88% 0.80% -24.1450 8.6046 -32.7496 
Wholesale trade-durable goods 1.56% 1.20% -8.8900 9.7673 -18.6573 
Investment & commodity firms, dealers, 
exchanges 
8.98% 3.60% 0.4833 9.9298 -9.4464 
Real estate; mortgage bankers and 
brokers 
2.47% 4.80% 4.2075 11.0438 -6.8363 
Air transportation and shipping 0.36% 0.80% 0.7800 14.4935 -13.7135 
Mining  15.84% 26.00% 20.5757 15.6190 4.9567 
Food and kindred products  1.93% 4.80% 6.5642 16.1842 -9.6200 
Communications equipment 1.16% 2.00% -12.8200 16.4405 -29.2605 
Metal and metal products 1.38% 1.20% 13.4300 17.4816 -4.0516 
Chemicals and allied products 1.29% 3.20% -12.2963 17.9191 -30.2153 
Business services 8.43% 7.20% -10.6122 18.5011 -29.1133 
Oil and gas; petroleum refining  6.69% 5.20% 40.0708 18.7137 21.3571 
Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 0.51% 0.80% 5.1650 18.9944 -13.8294 
Machinery 1.61% 3.20% -29.1863 19.3099 -48.4961 
Commercial banks, bank holding 
companies 
5.10% 2.00% 13.3860 19.8476 -6.4616 
Electronic and electrical equipment  3.32% 8.80% -6.5500 20.6813 -27.2313 
Hotels and casinos 0.95% 1.20% -38.9100 24.9491 -63.8591 
Prepackaged software 4.94% 1.60% 13.7175 26.8208 -13.1033 
Measuring, medical, photo equipment; 
clocks 
2.78% 0.40% -11.2000 27.7605 -38.9605 
Drugs 3.95% 3.20% -12.9275 28.1437 -41.0712 
Note: The table summarizes Chinese M&A concentrations in acquirer/target industries and the bid premia 
comparison with the average level in each stock exchange. The order is sorted by the overall premia paid (from 
smallest to largest). The red colorred cells refer to the scenarios where the average premia are lower than the 
general average. 
Table 5-6: Chinese M&A concentration in acquirer/target industries 
The M&A concentrations in acquirer and target industries exhibit quite different 
results. Chinese acquireres are mostly (48.80%) investment and commodity firms, 
which is typically a low premia industry with less than half the average bid premia 
paid globally, and they also paid significant lower premia than the industry average 
level. On contrary, the target industries are quite dispersed and affect the premia 
differential in different directions. For example, 26% of Chinese acquisitions involve 
targets from mining industry, which entitles around average level of premia to pay, but 
the Chinese acquirers are paying 5% higher the premia. In contrast, 8.8% of Chinese 
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acquisitions take electronic and electrical equipment firms as targets, which is a high 
premia context, but Chinese are paying averagely 27% less premia! However, Chinese 
acquirers do pay lower premia in most industries. 
All in all, from the industry-specific perspective, Chinese acquirers are mostly from 
the lower-than-average premia contexts and they pay lower premia in most acquirer 
industry categories as well. On contrary, target industries are widely dispersed in 
different premia contexts and Chinese acquirers do pay lower premia for targets from 
most industries. .  
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6  Regression analysis  
Regression analysis differs from general comparison in the way that it can take many 
explanatory variables into consideration at once, thus revealing the explanations for 
the observed takeover premia differential. Therefore, the individual effect of time, 
target country & listing stock exchange, acquirer/target industry, and the joint 
influence together with other control variables can be identified within the same 
framework. In further consideration of the bid premia comparsion in the last chapter 
and premia determinants suggested in previous research (see Table 6-1), I adjust the 
worldwide M&A dataset in 3.1.3.2, and introduce a comprehensive set of dependent 
and independent variables for the regression analysis.  
6.1 Dependent variable 
As discussed in the choice of premium session in Chapter 5, the regression analysis 
will continue using the one-day takeover premium as dependent variable, which is 
defined as "offer price to target stock price premium 1 day prior to announcement".  
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6.2 Independent variables 
In the previous chapter, Chinese and non-Chinese acquirer premia are compared with 
regards to different specific effect, i.e. time specific, industry specific, etc. In the 
regression model, they may also serve as the explanatory variables to explain the 
variation in premia. Moreover, additional control variables concerning acquirer, target 
and transaction-specific factors need to be considered.  
6.2.1 Chinese acquirer indicator  
In the comparsion of takeover premia paid by Chinese and non-Chinese acquirers, I 
set up the dummy for the acquirer being a Chinese firm; its coefficient will reveal the 
average differential in the premia paid due to the bidder being Chinese. 
6.2.2 Stock exchange-specific factors 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the stock exchange-specific effects may exist in Chinese 
acquisition premium determinantion. Therefore, fixed stock exchange dummies and 
dynamic stock market shocks are introduced to the regession model to reflect stock 
exchange-specific factors. 
6.2.2.1 Stock exchange fixed factors 
The fixed factors refer to the exchange regulations or norms that may constraint the 
transactions and influence the premia paid. Stock exchange fixed factors can then 
easily be modelled using exchange dummies. 
6.2.2.2  Stock exchange shock 
The stock exchange shock, similar to “industry shock”, refers to the stock market 
shifts over the pre-acqusition period. This factor is important in the acquisition 
decisiona in that the overall market change may greatly influence acquirers’ 
judgement on the targets’ prospects and growth potential. For example, the new policy 
in acertain stock market may immediatly influence the acqusition decision for targets 
in this market.  
The main difference from the static stock exchange dummy is the change over time, 
and the stock market index return in the 3 months before acquisition announcement is 
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used as a proxy for the stock market shocks23. 
 Panel A: Target stock exchange-specific factor description 
 
Global 
observations 
Chinese 
observations 
Chinese 
M&A  
Non-Chinese 
M&A 
Global 
M&A 
Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3) 
Market index 
return 9394 250 0.0224 0.0139 0.0141 0.0085 -0.0002 0.0083 
Hong Kong 9396 250 0.3200 0.0873 0.0934 0.2327** -0.0062 0.2266** 
Nasdaq 9396 250 0.1400 0.2740 0.2704 -0.134** 0.0036 -0.1304** 
Australia 9396 250 0.2080 0.1708 0.1718 0.0372 -0.001 0.0362 
New York 9396 250 0.0880 0.1362 0.1350 -0.0482** 0.0013 -0.047** 
Singapore 9396 250 0.0720 0.0490 0.0496 0.023 -0.0006 0.0224 
London AIM 9396 250 0.0200 0.0563 0.0553 -0.0363** 0.001 -0.0353** 
HK GEM 9396 250 0.0360 0.0184 0.0188 0.0176 -0.0005 0.0172 
Toronto 9396 250 0.0560 0.1035 0.1023 -0.0475** 0.0013 -0.0463** 
Note: The table summarizes all independent variable values under target stock exchange-specific factor set. The 
data in cells are the average value of each variable in each dataset (value for a dummy means the average 
percentage of transactions), the difference is based on a t-test (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01). 
Table 6-1: Data description of target stock exchange-specific factors 
6.2.3 Target country-specific factors  
The target country-specific factors distinguish premia paid for targets from certain 
countries. They reflect the country-wide regulations or environments that may 
influence the takeover premia determinantion and can be easily approximated by the 
target country dummies.24  
 
 
                                                             
23 The 3-month interval is determined because we deem such a time length necessary to prepare for the acquisition, 
especially for big multinationals where the interval between announcement and settlement may take a long time. 
Moreover, many other empirical papers take 3 months as the longest interval to complete the abnormal return 
calculation.  
24 Due to the dispersed distribution of target countries, we set country dummies only for the target countries 
specified in the comparison in last chapter.  
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 Panel B: Target country-specific factor description 
 
Global 
observations 
Chinese 
observations 
Chinese 
M&A  
Non-Chinese 
M&A 
Global 
M&A 
Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3) 
China 9396 250 0.3840 0.0122 0.0221 0.3718** -0.0099** 0.3619** 
Hong Kong 9396 250 0.2160 0.1022 0.1053 0.1138** -0.003 0.1107** 
Australia 9396 250 0.1960 0.1697 0.1704 0.0263 -0.0007 0.0256 
Canada 9396 250 0.1160 0.2014 0.1991 -0.0854** 0.0023 -0.0831** 
Singapore 9396 250 0.0200 0.0454 0.0447 -0.0254** 0.0007 -0.0247** 
US 9396 250 0.0400 0.3866 0.3774 -0.3466** 0.0092 -0.3374** 
UK 9396 250 0.0200 0.0508 0.0500 -0.0308** 0.0008 -0.03** 
Note: The table summarizes all independent variables under target country-specific factors. The data in cells are 
the average value of each variable in each dataset (value for a dummy means the average percentage of 
transactions), the difference is based on a t-test (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01). 
Table 6-2: Data description of target country-specific factors 
6.2.4 Time-specific factors  
The different business cycles or the introductions of new policies may cause 
differentials in premia from Chinese and non-Chinese acquirers. So the time effects 
also need to be incorporated in the model and can be approximated by year dummies.  
 Panel C: Year-specific factor description 
 
Global 
observations 
Chinese 
observations 
Chinese 
M&A  
Non-Chinese 
M&A 
Global 
M&A 
Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3) 
2003 9396 250 0.0120 0.0677 0.0662 -0.0557** 0.0015 -0.0542** 
2004 9396 250 0.0480 0.0714 0.0708 -0.0234 0.0006 -0.0228 
2005 9396 250 0.0240 0.0745 0.0731 -0.0505** 0.0013 -0.0491** 
2006 9396 250 0.0120 0.0877 0.0857 -0.0757** 0.002 -0.0737** 
2007 9396 250 0.0320 0.1046 0.1027 -0.0726** 0.0019 -0.0707** 
2008 9396 250 0.0960 0.0964 0.0964 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0004 
2009 9396 250 0.1240 0.0965 0.0973 0.0275 -0.0007 0.0267 
2010 9396 250 0.1120 0.0860 0.0867 0.026 -0.0007 0.0253 
2011 9396 250 0.1200 0.0752 0.0764 0.0448* -0.0012 0.0436* 
2012 9396 250 0.1400 0.0709 0.0727 0.0691** -0.0018 0.0673** 
2013 9396 250 0.1200 0.0549 0.0566 0.0651** -0.0017 0.0634** 
2014 9396 250 0.1400 0.0546 0.0568 0.0854** -0.0023 0.0832** 
Note: The table summarizes all independent variables under time-specific factors. The data in cells are the average 
value of each variable in each dataset (value for a dummy means the average percentage of transactions), the 
difference is based on a t-test (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01). 
Table 6-3: Data description of time-specific factors 
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6.2.5 Acquirer industry-specific factors  
Acquirer industry-specific innovations (e.g. industry shocks) or norms may cause 
differences in acquisition and its premium decisions. Therefore, I approximate these 
effects by industry dummies.  
 Panel D: Acquirer industry-specific factor description 
 
Global 
observations 
Chinese 
observations 
Chinese 
M&A  
Non-Chinese 
M&A 
Global 
M&A 
Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3) 
Investment & commodity 
firms,dealers,exchanges  
9396 250 0.4880 0.3647 0.3680 0.1233** -0.0033 0.12** 
Mining 9396 250 0.0840 0.0970 0.0966 -0.013 0.0003 -0.0126 
Business services 9396 250 0.0600 0.0469 0.0473 0.0131 -0.0003 0.0127 
Metal and metal products 9396 250 0.0520 0.0160 0.0169 0.036* -0.001 0.0351* 
Oil and gas; petroleum 
refining 
9396 250 0.0400 0.0520 0.0517 -0.012 0.0003 -0.0117 
Electronic and electrical 
equipment 
9396 250 0.0360 0.0225 0.0229 0.0135 -0.0004 0.0131 
Real estate; mortgage 
bankers and brokers 
9396 250 0.0200 0.0138 0.0139 0.0062 -0.0002 0.0061 
Prepackaged software 9396 250 0.0120 0.0279 0.0275 -0.0159* 0.0004 -0.0155* 
Electric, gas, and water 
distribution 
9396 250 0.0200 0.0143 0.0145 0.0057 -0.0002 0.0055 
Food and kindred 
products 
9396 250 0.0200 0.0120 0.0122 0.008 -0.0002 0.0078 
Commercial banks, bank 
holding companies 
9396 250 0.0160 0.0480 0.0471 -0.032** 0.0009 -0.0311** 
Holding companies, 
except banks 
9396 250 0.0240 0.0103 0.0106 0.0137 -0.0004 0.0134 
Drugs 9396 250 0.0080 0.0302 0.0296 -0.022** 0.0006 -0.0216** 
Air transportation and 
shipping 
9396 250 0.0040 0.0022 0.0022 0.0018 0 0.0018 
Transportation equipment 9396 250 0.0160 0.0050 0.0053 0.011 -0.0003 0.0107 
Textile and apparel 
products 
9396 250 0.0120 0.0030 0.0032 0.009 -0.0002 0.0088 
Machinery 9396 250 0.0160 0.0097 0.0099 0.0063 -0.0002 0.0061 
Wholesale trade-durable 
goods 
9396 250 0.0080 0.0109 0.0109 -0.0029 0.0001 -0.0029 
Stone, clay, glass, and 
concrete products 
9396 250 0.0080 0.0028 0.0030 0.0052 -0.0001 0.005 
Construction firms 9396 250 0.0040 0.0062 0.0062 -0.0022 0.0001 -0.0022 
Note: The table summarizes all independent variables under acquirer industry-specific factors. The data in cells are 
the average value of each variable in each dataset (value for a dummy means the average percentage of 
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transactions), the difference is based on a t-test (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01). 
Table 6-4: Data description of acquirer industry-specific factors 
6.2.6 Target industry-specific factors  
Target industry-specific innovations or regulations may cause the differences in 
acquisition premia as well. Therefore, these effects are approximated by industry 
dummies.  
 Panel E: Target industry-specific factor description 
 
Global 
observations 
Chinese 
observations 
Chinese 
M&A  
Non-Chinese 
M&A 
Global 
M&A 
Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3) 
Mining  9396 250 0.2600 0.1555 0.1583 0.1045** -0.0028 0.1017** 
Electronic and Electrical 
Equipment  9396 250 0.0880 0.0317 0.0332 0.0563** -0.0015 0.0548** 
Business Services 9396 250 0.0720 0.0846 0.0843 -0.0126 0.0003 -0.0123 
Real Estate; Mortgage 
Bankers and Brokers 9396 250 0.0480 0.0241 0.0247 0.0239 -0.0006 0.0233 
Food and Kindred Products  9396 250 0.0480 0.0185 0.0193 0.0295* -0.0008 0.0287* 
Oil and Gas; Petroleum 
Refining  9396 250 0.0520 0.0674 0.0669 -0.0154 0.0004 -0.0149 
Electric, Gas, and Water 
Distribution 9396 250 0.0400 0.0176 0.0182 0.0224 -0.0006 0.0218 
Investment & Commodity 
Firms,Dealers,Exchanges 9396 250 0.0360 0.0913 0.0898 -0.055** 0.0015 -0.0538** 
Metal and Metal Products 9396 250 0.0120 0.0139 0.0138 -0.0019 0.0001 -0.0018 
Machinery 9396 250 0.0320 0.0156 0.0161 0.0164 -0.0004 0.0159 
Prepackaged Software 9396 250 0.0160 0.0503 0.0494 -0.034** 0.0009 -0.0334** 
Drugs 9396 250 0.0320 0.0397 0.0395 -0.0077 0.0002 -0.0075 
Chemicals and Allied 
Products 9396 250 0.0320 0.0124 0.0129 0.0196 -0.0005 0.0191 
Textile and Apparel 
Products 9396 250 0.0200 0.0075 0.0079 0.0125 -0.0003 0.0121 
Commercial Banks, Bank 
Holding Companies 9396 250 0.0200 0.0518 0.0510 -0.032** 0.0008 -0.031** 
Transportation Equipment 9396 250 0.0200 0.0062 0.0066 0.0138 -0.0004 0.0134 
Communications 
Equipment 9396 250 0.0200 0.0114 0.0116 0.0086 -0.0002 0.0084 
Air Transportation and 
Shipping 9396 250 0.0080 0.0035 0.0036 0.0045 -0.0001 0.0044 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and 
Concrete Products 9396 250 0.0080 0.0050 0.0051 0.003 -0.0001 0.0029 
Transportation and Shipping 9396 250 0.0080 0.0191 0.0188 -0.0111 0.0003 -0.0108 
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(except air) 
Wholesale Trade-Durable 
Goods 9396 250 0.0120 0.0157 0.0156 -0.0037 0.0001 -0.0036 
Wholesale 
Trade-Nondurable Goods 9396 250 0.0120 0.0078 0.0079 0.0042 -0.0001 0.0041 
Hotels and Casinos 9396 250 0.0120 0.0094 0.0095 0.0026 -0.0001 0.0025 
Measuring, Medical, Photo 
Equipment; Clocks 9396 250 0.0040 0.0284 0.0278 -0.024** 0.0006 -0.0238** 
Motion Picture Production 
and Distribution 9396 250 0.0000 0.0066 0.0064 -0.006** 0.0002 -0.0064** 
Advertising Services 9396 250 0.0160 0.0032 0.0035 0.0128 -0.0003 0.0125 
Note: The table summarizes all independent variables under target industry-specific factors. The data in cells are 
the average value of each variable in each dataset (value for a dummy means the average percentage of 
transactions), the difference is based on a t-test (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01). 
Table 6-5: Data description of target industry-specific factors 
6.2.7 Other control variables  
The country, stock exchange, time and industry-specific variables may specify the 
premia differential with regards to these factors. However, the reality may be much 
more complicated in the way that other considerations are in corporated into the bid 
premia. To fully understand the premia paid and compare Chinese and non-Chinese 
differentials, I introduce the additional control variables into the regression model in 
the following categories according to the previous research analysis frameworks 
(Table 6-7).  
6.2.7.1 Acquirer regions 
Similar to the difference between Chinese and non-Chinese acquisition premia, 
acquirers from other countries may also tend to pay higher or lower premia than the 
rest. To control for these potential tendencies, I introduce dummies for the seven other 
most popular acquirers regions presenting in the dataset25: United States, Canada, 
Hong Kong, Australia, United Kingdom, Singapore and Japan. 
6.2.7.2 Other acquirer-specific characteristics  
The acquirer-specific characteristics (e.g. publicity, management involvement)  
                                                             
25 The countries are selected based on the number of available transactions, and there is a huge gap after Chinese 
firms being acquirers.   
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refect the more of the acquirers’ ability and willingness to pay takeover premia. Thus 
they might play an important role in premia determination .  
6.2.7.2.1 Management as acquirer 
As indicated in Qiu et al (2014), management have the tendency to pursue personal 
benefit from the transactions. Therefore, whether the management is part of the 
acquirer has economic implications for bid premium determination.  
6.2.7.2.2 Acquirer cash holding 
According to the free cash flow hypothesis and Fich et al. (2013), cash-rich firms tend 
to do acquisitions, even the bad ones when they have much free cash on hand.  
6.2.7.2.3 Buyside government involvement 
This characteristic is especially important for many Chinese acquisitions, since the 
Government always has stake in big Chinese MNCs, especially in the equipment, oil 
and gas industries.   
6.2.7.2.4 Financial firm acquirer 
Financial firms differ from ordinary ones in their capital structure and business goals. 
In general, financial firms have higher leverage and focus more on restructuring the 
firm for resale in the future, so they may be more reluctant to pay high premia. That is 
also why many scholars analyze exclusively financial firms, such as the banking 
industry.  
6.2.7.2.5 Others 
Some other acquirer characteristics may also have an influence on the bid premium. 
Such as acquirer performance (ROE), publicity, long-term debt to equity ratio, 
acquiror's termination fee as percentage of transaction value, etc. In theory, most 
possible acquirer-specific factors shall be added to approximate the real decision. 
However, in reality the problem with adding extra variables is that most of the data 
are missing, as seen in the Table 6-6.  
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 Panel F: Other acquirer-specific factor description 
 
Global 
observations 
Chinese 
observations 
Chinese 
M&A  
Non-Chinese 
M&A 
Global 
M&A 
Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3) 
Acquirors with 
management 
9396 
250 
0.0960 0.0138 0.0160 0.0822** -0.0022 0.08** 
Acquirer as financial firm 9396 250 0.0040 0.0402 0.0393 -0.036** 0.001 -0.035** 
Buyside government 
involvement 
9396 
250 
0.3480 0.0420 0.0501 0.306** -0.008** 0.2979** 
Acquirer cash holding 3453 40 1355.9340 1511.5200 1509.7180 -155.586 1.8023 -153.784 
Public acquirer 9394 250 0.2120 0.5302 0.5217 -0.318** 0.0085 -0.309** 
Acquirer ROE 3882 44 0.1227 0.0419 0.0429 0.081** -0.0009 0.0798** 
Acquiror LT debt/equity 3142 36 0.5434 1.0404 1.0347 -0.497** 0.0057 -0.491** 
Acquiror's termination fee/ 
transaction value 
923 11 10.7805 17.8536 17.7693 -7.073** 0.0843 -6.988** 
Note: The table summarizes all independent variables under other acquirer-specific factors. The data in cells are 
the average value of each variable in each dataset (value for a dummy means the average percentage of 
transactions), the difference is based on a t-test (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01). 
Table 6-6: Data description of other acquirer-specific factors 
6.2.7.3 Other target-specific characteristics  
Target-specific characteristics lay the basis for takeover bid, so it is of great 
importance to determine the appropriate premia.   
6.2.7.3.1 Target M/B ratio  
Market to book value is often of great concern in M&A decisions. Intuitively, if the 
market value of target assets are significantly lower than its book value, then it is 
possible that the firm is in distress; but there is also chance that the firm is 
undervalued. However, under both scenarios the purchase can be a good bargain, and 
the acquirers may be willing to pay a higher premium.  
6.2.7.3.2 Target long-term debt / equity ratio 
High long-term debt of a target may bring potential financial synergies to the acquirer 
(Leland, 2007), but also comes with higher risk. Therefore it may affect bid premia in 
either direction. 
6.2.7.3.3 Percent of shares held at announcement 
As Shleifer & Vishny (1986) indicate, the bid premia would decrease with the original 
percentage of shares held at announcement.  
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6.2.7.3.4 Relative size with acquirers 
Slusky & Caves (1991) implies the relative size between acquirer and target may 
affect the premia. The relative size is defined as the acquirer’s net sales divided by 
thetarget’s26. 
6.2.7.3.5 Others  
Some other factors representing target characteristics could also be considered, such 
as the target ROE (performance), sellside government ownship, target's termination 
fee as percentage of transaction value, etc. Similar to the situation with acquirer 
characteristics, many observations are missing for the introduced explanatory 
variables.  
 Panel G: Other target-specific factor description 
 
Global 
observations 
Chinese 
observations 
Chinese 
M&A  
Non-Chinese 
M&A 
Global 
M&A 
Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3) 
M/B ratio 4548 32 4.9212 5.3177 5.3149 -0.3965 0.0028 -0.3937 
Target LT debt/equity  5388 136 0.4193 2.4947 2.4423 -2.0753** 0.0524 -2.0229** 
% of shares held at 
announcement 
2015 
83 
42.2217 34.2154 34.5452 8.0063** -0.329 7.6765** 
Relative size 3345 39 1721.0119 1549.7507 1551.7475 171.2611 -1.997 169.2643 
Target ROE 4984 133 13.3131 23.4468 23.1764 -10.134** 0.2704 -9.8633** 
Target's termination 
fee/transaction value 
2814 
21 
6.4269 9.6098 9.5861 -3.183** 0.0238 -3.1592** 
Sellside government 
involvement 
9396 250 0.0720 0.0114 0.0130 0.0606** -0.002 0.059** 
Note: The table summarizes all independent variables under other target-specific factors. The data in cells are the 
average value of each variable in each dataset (value for a dummy means the average percentage of transactions), 
the difference is based on a t-test (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01). 
Table 6-7: Data description of other target-specific factors 
6.2.7.4 Other transaction specific characteristics  
Transaction-specific characteristics describe how the acquisitions are initiated, 
undertaken and finalized, and they are important since different forms, attitudes and 
processes of the transaction directly influence how the premia are determined.  
                                                             
26 Since this item uses the net sales after the deduction of returns, allowances for damaged or missing goods and 
any discounts allowed, the ratio can be negative. For consideration purposes, I remove the negative values.  
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6.2.7.4.1 Cross-border transaction indicator 
Suggested by Rossi & Volpin (2004), whether the M&A is cross-border is of great 
importance. Moreover, the existence of firms listed primarily in foreign stock markets 
also complicates the definition of cross-border transactions. Therefore, from a more 
comprehensive point of view, I define the cross-border transactions in the following 
two layers. 
Geographic cross-border transactions: M&A transactions between buyers and 
sellers with primary businesses in different countries. 
Exchange-based cross-border transactions: M&A transactions between buyers and 
sellers with primary listing exchanges in different countries27.  
6.2.7.4.2 Transaction attitude  
The attitude of M&A transactions may influence the bid premium directly. Especially 
in hostile acquisitions, acquirers may encounter various defensive strategies, which 
may greatly increase the cost. Many papers, such as Rossi & Volpin (2004), 
Sudarsanam et al. (2010), and Fich et al. (2013), find similar relationships. Therefore, 
I introduce the hostile bid indicator to control for this effect.  
6.2.7.4.3 Competing bid indicator 
Similar to the transaction attitude, the existence of a competing bid might increase the 
difficulty in wining the bid, and thus increase the bid premium(Varaiya, 1987, 
Haunschild, 1994, Hambrick & Hayward, 1997, etc.). 
6.2.7.4.4 Percentage of shares acquired  
Shleifer & Vishny (1986) mention the percentage of shares to be acquired as an 
important determinant of bid premia. In general, the higher percentage of shares to be 
acquired, the higher premia needed to complete the transaction.   
                                                             
27 Many acquirers are private, thus not listing on a stock exchange. For consistency, I classify these observations 
into exchange-based cross-border transactions because the buyers and sellers are not sharing the same regulatory 
framework in a similar manner. 
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6.2.7.4.5 Post-acquisition ownership over 50% 
As indicated in Walkling & Edmister (1985), whether the acquirers need to obtain 
over 50% of target ownership to finish the aqusition directly influences the shares to 
be acquired in transaction, and the strategies to be adopted, thus the acquisition.  
6.2.7.4.6 Others 
Apart from the characteristics of the deal listed above, many other specificities of the 
acquisition also affect the premia to pay and are backed by relevant literatures, such as 
the tender offer indicator, going private label, percentage of cash involved, existence 
of poison pills, cross industry indicator, etc. They all need to be considered in 
conducting the comparison using OLS techniques.  
 Panel H: Other deal-specific factor description 
 
Global 
observations 
Chinese 
observations 
Chinese 
M&A  
Non-Chinese 
M&A 
Global 
M&A Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3) 
Geographic cross 
border 
9396 250 0.6160 0.2393 0.2494 0.3767** -0.01 0.3666** 
Exchange-based 
cross border 
9396 250 0.9400 0.8024 0.8061 0.1376** -0.004 0.1339** 
Hostile  9396 250 0.0080 0.0046 0.0047 0.0034 -0.000 0.0033 
Competing bidder 9396 250 0.0240 0.0268 0.0267 -0.0028 0.0001 -0.0027 
Percentage of 
shares acquired 
9208 245 36.9754 56.8689 56.3396 -19.893** 0.5293 -19.3642** 
Post acquisition 
ownership over 
50% 
9244 246 0.4634 0.6078 0.6040 -0.1444** 0.0038 -0.1405** 
Tender offer 9396 250 0.1960 0.2468 0.2454 -0.0508* 0.0014 -0.0494 
Going private 9396 250 0.2160 0.1445 0.1464 0.0715** -0.002 0.0696** 
Cross industry 9396 250 0.6720 0.4973 0.5019 0.1747** -0.005 0.1701** 
Percentage of 
cash 
6241 172 99.1422 92.5002 92.6833 6.642** -0.183 6.4589** 
Poison pill 9396 250 0.0000 0.0042 0.0040 -0.0042** 0.0001 -0.004** 
Note: The table summarizes all independent variables under other deal-specific factors. The data in cells are the 
average value of each variable in each dataset (value for a dummy means the average percentage of transactions), 
the difference is based on a t-test (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01). 
Table 6-8: Data description of other deal-specific factors 
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6.3 Data summary  
As reflected in the Chinese and non-Chinese acquisition comparison - in terms of 
target listing extock exchange, country, time of transaction, acquirer/target industry as 
well as other acquirer/target/deal specific factors - Chinese deals are significantly 
different from the rest in most categories, notably in the aspects of Chinese target 
dummy and buyside government involvement dummy, the difference between 
Chinese and non-Chinese acquisitions is so great that the worldwide average levels 
are significantly changed by Chinese activities. This situation may make sense 
because Chinese firms are more familiar with Chinese firms, so the premia paid may 
be lower; at the same time, many Chinese big MNCs are at least owned partially by 
the Government, so the buyside government invlvement is high among Chinese 
acquisitions.   
Based on the observation data in the table above, the distribution of missing values in 
the data set, which greatly constrains the analysis, is given in the Table 6-9.  
Available observations Independent variables 
0-1000 1 
1000-3000 2 
3000-4500 4 
4500-9000 4 
9000-9396 98 
Sum 109 
Table 6-9: Data availability description 
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6.4 General-to-specific regression 
The data description presents a preliminary impression how Chinese and non-Chinese 
M&A differ in various aspects, as well as the observations availabile for each variable. 
In balancing the data availability problem against having a comprehensive set of 
explanatory variables, I set up two generalized regression models (Model I & II) 
based on the variables with 9000+ observations and 4500+ observations respectively28. 
I follow the general-to-specific regression procedure to yield specific models. 29  
 Model I      
(5%) 
Model II     
(5%) 
Chinese acquirer indicator -5.152  
 (2.15)*  
Market index return -29.029 -37.513 
 (8.33)** (5.93)** 
Nasdaq Stock Exchange  -4.031 4.032 
 (2.20)* (3.02)** 
New York Stock Exchange -8.969  
 (4.82)**  
London AIM Market -4.853  
 (2.98)**  
China as target country -17.916  
 (6.73)**  
Hong Kong as target region -8.716 -16.497 
 (6.84)** (4.11)** 
United States as target country 6.387  
 (3.38)**  
Year 2003  5.328 
  (2.70)** 
Year 2004 -4.382  
 (3.14)**  
Year 2008 3.059  
                                                             
28 The cutline of 9000 is set to make full use of the maximum sample size (9396), while 4500 is only around half 
of available observations. The difference between the two independent variable sets includes target M/B ratio, 
long-term debt to equity ratio, target ROE and percentage of cash in the transaction, which frequently appear in the 
premium analysis literatures. To be robust, I set up the two models for comparison.   
29 The results of general models, specific models (10% significance level) and specific models (5% significance 
level) can be found in Appendix 3: General-to-specific regression modeling results. 
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 (2.23)*  
Year 2009 7.140 17.264 
 (5.63)** (5.87)** 
Year 2010 6.070 11.680 
 (4.69)** (4.59)** 
Year 2011 6.395 6.922 
 (4.67)** (2.61)** 
Year 2012 7.929 8.777 
 (5.70)** (3.41)** 
Year 2013 3.649  
 (2.34)*  
Acquirer from food and kindred products industry  11.523 
  (2.92)** 
Acquirer from investment commodity industry -7.134 -4.407 
 (8.56)** (3.07)** 
Acquirer from oil and gas petroleum industry -3.469  
 (2.13)*  
Acquirer from prepackaged software industry 6.546 7.789 
 (3.02)** (2.32)* 
Acquirer from drugs industry 9.931  
 (4.78)**  
Target from electric, gas, and water distribution 
industry 
-6.686  
(2.56)*  
Target from wholesale trade-nondurable goods 
industry 
-7.628  
(1.97)*  
Target from hotels and casinos industry 11.035 13.361 
 (3.10)** (2.81)** 
Target from  electronic and electrical equipment 
industry 
 8.935 
 (2.60)** 
Target from drugs industry   14.724 
  (5.21)** 
Target from stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 
industry 
 13.598 
 (1.97)* 
Acquirers with management 11.324 15.728 
 (3.91)** (4.07)** 
Acquirer from United States 2.900 6.611 
 (2.41)* (3.48)** 
Acquirer from Hong Kong  12.658 
  (2.91)** 
Geographic cross-border 6.118 8.788 
 (7.27)** (4.28)** 
Hostile 12.484  
 (2.40)*  
Competing bidder 11.929  
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 (5.49)**  
Percentage of shares acquired 0.172 0.121 
 (10.06)** (3.77)** 
Post-acquisition ownership over 50% 6.590 14.742 
 (4.60)** (5.29)** 
Tender offer 6.944 2.782 
 (7.89)** (1.98)* 
Going private 4.738  
 (4.17)**  
Poison pill 14.889 21.934 
 (2.70)** (2.97)** 
Percentage of cash  0.086 
  (3.26)** 
M/B ratio  -0.038 
  (2.19)* 
Target LT debt/equity ratio  0.050 
  (2.22)* 
_Cons -0.351 -16.381 
 (0.35) (5.16)** 
R2 0.19 0.25 
N  9,206  2,257 
Chinese observations used in the regression 250 32 
Note: The table summarizes the specific models (5% significance level) for Model I & II. The order of independent 
variables follows target stock exchange, target operating country, year of transction, acquirer industry, target 
industry, other acquirer, deal and target–specific factors. The numbers in cells are coefficients and the numbers in 
parentheses are t-values (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01). 
Table 6-10: Summary of specific regression results 
The two models yield different regression results and end up with quite different sets 
of independent variables. Though Model II has a marginally better expanatory power 
(R2), the number of available observations is less than 25% of Model I, and the 
Chinese observations available drop dramatically from 250 to 32, so it is reasonable to 
suspect that the Model II may suffer severe sample selection bias. To be conservative, 
I will use only the Model I for further discussion in the next chapter.  
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7 Regression results and further discussion  
7.1 General-to-specific regression results  
7.1.1 Chinese acquirer-specific effects 
In view of the main hypothesis of the thesis, the Chinese acquirer indicator is of great 
concern in the regression model. According to Model I, the coefficient of the Chinese 
acquirer indicator is still significantly different from zero. Controlling for other 
explanatory factors, Chinese acquirers pay 5.15% lower the premia compared to 
non-Chinese acquirers, ceteris paribus. Moreover, Chinese acquisition premia are on 
average 15.4% lower than non-Chinese acquisitions (Session 5.2). So the 10.25% 
difference is then explained by the other explanatory variables in the Model I (detailed 
analysis on how much each variable explains the difference is to be presented in the 
next sesssion 7.2).  
7.1.2 Stock exchange-specific effects  
Out of the stock exchange shock and nine stock exchange dummies, only the market 
index return, and NASDAQ, New York and London-AIM stock market dummies are 
significant. The negative effect of the market index return coincides with the M&A 
motive to acquire undervalued firms. The fact that these three stock markets as target 
listing stock exchange stand out means that there may be some other premia 
determinants exclusive to these markets, which are not included in the variable set 
here, such as the unique takeover regulations.  
7.1.3 Target region-specific effects 
Similar results apply to target region-specific effects. Of the eight major target regions, 
Chinese and Hong Kong targets show significantly lower premia, while US targets 
require significantly higher premia. The finding may be explained by cultural issues. 
As introduced in the Chinese acquisition specificities, Guanxi (relationship) plays a 
vital role in the Asian business conext, especially in China and nearby regions, such as 
Hong Kong, and the merger deals often occur between business connections. 
Therefore, the economic premia paid may be systematically lower. By contrast, the 
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US-based business is more economic/profit - oriented, so acquirers may have to 
increase the bid to get a takeover through. 
7.1.4 Time-specific effects  
Coinciding with the timing of the last two global merger waves, worldwide M&A 
incured lower premia in the year 2004, and higher premia in 2008-2013. Part of the 
reason for the difference in sign and time length is that the 2008 financial crisis hit the 
economy worldwide, thus the firm values were much lower; while the wave in 2003 
was pumped by the introduction of financial derivatives and the stock market was 
growing dramatically by then.  
As time passing by, the world economy recovered from the crisis and the markets 
were going back to normal situation. Therefore, the market-specific effects would 
reduce to insignificance level gradually.  
7.1.5 Acquirer/Target industry-specific effects  
Acquirer and target-specific factors matter in the premia decision. For example, 
transactions with acquirers from prepackaged software or drugs industry, and/or 
targets from hotels and casinos industry incurred higher premia, while transactions 
with acquirers from investment commodity, or oil and gas petroleum industry, and/or 
targets from electric, gas, and water distribution or wholesale trade-nondurable goods 
industry had lower takeover premia.  
7.1.6 Other control variable effects  
Many control variables turn out to be significantly different from zero in the specific 
model, indicating that additional consideration regarding acquirer, deal and target 
characteristics impact takeover premia. In accordance with the analysis in the 
introduction, the management’s involvement in acquisition, US acquirers, 
cross-border deals, hostile transactions, existence of competing bidders, percentage of 
shares acquired, over 50% post-acquisition ownership, tender offer, going private 
deals, and poison pills all raise the premia in the transactions.  
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Combining the general comparisons between Chinese and non-Chinese acquisiton 
premia and the general-to-specific regression results, preliminary conclusion can be 
drawed that the stock exchange, target region, time, industry-specific factors and other 
introduced control variables do play a role in explaining the difference in premia paid 
by Chinese and non-Chinese acquirers. However, in terms of the explanatory power 
of each variable set, I will further the discussion in the next session.  
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7.2 Break down of bid premia difference explained 
Based on Model I, I extract the coefficients of each explanatory variable and the 
average difference between Chinese and non-Chinese acquisition datasets, and break 
down the difference between premia paid by Chinese and non-Chinese acquirers into 
different aspects.  
Premium determinants Coefficient 
Difference between Chinese and 
non-Chinese acquisitions 
Difference 
explained 
Chinese acquirer indicator -5.1518 1 -5.1518 (31.80%) 
Selected target stock exchange-specific factors 
Market index return -29.0286 0.0085 -0.2479 
Nasdaq Stock Exchange -4.0305 -0.1339 0.5400 
New York Stock Exchange -8.9692 -0.0482 0.4326 
London-AIM Market -4.8533 -0.0363 0.1762 
Sub-total 
  
0.9009 (-5.56%) 
Selected target region-specific factors 
China as target country -17.9156 0.3717 -6.6602 
Hong Kong as target region -8.7163 0.1137 -0.9916 
United States as target country 6.3873 -0.3466 -2.213 
Sub-total 
  
-9.8658 (60.90%) 
Selected time-specific factors 
Year 2004 -4.3815 -0.0233 0.1025 
Year 2008 3.0593 -0.0004 -0.0013 
Year 2009 7.1401 0.0274 0.1960 
Year 2010 6.0697 0.0259 0.1575 
Year 2011 6.3949 0.0447 0.2863 
Year 2012 7.9288 0.0691 0.5482 
Year 2013 3.6485 0.0651 0.2375 
Sub-total 
  
1.5269 (-9.42%) 
Selected acquirer industry-specific factors 
Acquirer from investment 
commodity industry 
-7.1340 0.12325 -0.8792 
Acquirer from oil and gas 
petroleum industry 
-3.4694 -0.0120 0.0417 
Acquirer from prepackaged 
software industry 
6.5456 -0.0158 -0.1039 
Acquirer from drugs industry 9.9314 -0.022 -0.2202 
Sub-total 
  
-1.1616 (7.17%) 
Selected target industry-specific factors 
Target from electric, gas, and 
water distribution industry 
-6.6863 0.0223 -0.1497 
Target from wholesale -7.6278 0.0042 -0.0323 
69 
 
trade-nondurable goods industry 
Target from hotels and casinos 
industry 
11.0350 0.0026 0.0286 
Sub-total 
  
-0.1534 (0.95%) 
Selected other acquirer-specific factors 
Acquirers with management 11.3243 0.0822 0.9311 
Acquirer from United States 2.9000 -0.3770 -1.0935 
Sub-total 
  
-0.1624 (1.00%) 
Selected other deal-specific factors 
Geographic cross-border 6.1180 0.3766 2.3044 
Hostile 12.4841 0.0034 0.0425 
Competing bidder 11.9291 -0.0027 -0.0332 
Percentage of shares acquired 0.1719 -19.8935 -3.4203 
Post-merger ownership over 50% 6.5895 -0.1443 -0.9514 
Tender offer 6.9438 -0.0507 -0.3525 
Going private 4.7384 0.0714 0.3385 
Poison pill 14.8894 -0.0041 -0.0618 
Sub-total 
  
-2.1339 (13.17%) 
SUM 
  
-16.2012 
Note: The table summarizes the breaking-down of the average difference between Chinese and non-Chinese 
acquisition premia. The coefficients and average differences between datasets of each individual explanatory 
variable are listed, and the explained premia difference are summed up in each panel, the percentage numbers in 
parentheses reflect the average percentage of total difference explained. The deviation of total effects from average 
premia difference from average value is due to rounding errors.  
Table 7-1: Break down of average premia difference explained 
From the table, it is clear that over 60% of the average premia difference is explained 
by the target country-specific effects: Chinese firms mostly buy Chinese or Hong 
Kong targets, which typically involve less-than-average premia to pay. Another 14% 
of the difference is explained by the control variables. The acquirer/target 
industry-specific effects capture less than 8% of the difference. Interestingly, the 
cumulative target stock exchange and time-specific effects even indicate Chinese 
acquirers paid more from these two aspects. Even so, around 31% of the premia 
difference is still not explained by these introduced explanatory factors, and is left 
over to Chinese acquire indicators.  
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7.3 Unique findings 
Following the literature review, this thesis is based on the most comprehensive set of 
bid premia characteristics that the data allow, so the analysis and the results tie into 
the literature as closely as possible. Target country, time and industry-specific factors, 
and the additional control variables from the premia analysis frameworks, play 
significant roles in explaining the bid premia differential between Chinese and 
non-Chinese acquirers. Yet divergences and unique findings also exist, especially in 
the direction of premia differentials.  
It is commonly assumed by academic papers and non-academic publications that the 
unique Chinese culture, Government policies and institutional incentives lead Chinese 
acquirers to overpay for their targets, especially in cross-border transactions. On 
contrary, the comparisons in this thesis reveal the opposite. In most acquisitions 
(domestic or international), Chinese acquirers pay lower premia compared to the rest 
of the world. In general, two reasons may explain the divergence. On the one hand, 
the conservativeness in Chinese culture and “Guanxi”-based business interactions 
may significantly lower the bid premia paid in the transactions. On the other hand, the 
technical adjustments of premia data may cause the difference as well. For example, 
to keep the most data possible, I retain the negative premia and set a high upper limit 
on the positive premia, whereas many papers - such as Asplund & Kjellesvik (2012), 
Moeller et al (2005) – exclude negative premia and limit the pisitive. Looking back to 
the comparison in the Figure 5-2, we can also see that the Chinese acquisition set has 
relatively more negative premia observations (45.6% compared to 31.3%), therefore 
the Chinese takeover premia are systematically lower.   
All in all, both convergence and divergence with previous research exists in my 
findings, and I suggest that unique cultural and institutional factors are responsible for 
the divergent findings.  
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8 Conclusion  
An extensive literature suggests that Chinese acquirers may pay different premia for 
their targets under the influence of the political control (where the Government is a 
major stakeholder), and/or the unique aspects of Chinese culture (such as the 
Confuscianism and the “Guanxi”), which makes Chinese acquirers conservative in 
target selection and pricing. Therefore, the thesis is developed to compare the M&A 
bid premia paid by Chinese and non-Chinese acquirers.  
In the Chinese M&A activity description, I chart the 4 “merger waves” alongside 
Chinese M&A history, as well as the clustering in target country, stock exchange and 
target/acquirer industry. Moreover, the special treatments of shares listed on Chinese 
mainland stock exchanges are highlighted, and thus the need to exclude them. 
The general comparison suggests that Chinese firms pay on average, 15% lower 
premia than non-Chinese; specialized comparisons over time and across countries, 
stock markets and industries also reveal lower premia in most scenarios. Moreover, 
the concentrations of Chinese M&A activities in lower-than-average premia target 
countries, stock exchanges, acquirer industries are identified as further explanation for 
the low average bid premium.  
Using a global M&A database and fitting a general-to-specific regression, I find that 
target country, stock exchange, time and acquirer/target industry-specific factors 
explain over 68% of the difference in premia paid by Chinese and non-Chinese 
acquirers. In breaking down the premia differentials, I show that target 
country-specific and other deal-specific factors explain the most of the premia 
difference (at 60% and 13% respectively); while the stock exchange-specific and 
time-specific factors widen the difference by 5.56% and 9.42%. 
In contrast the commonly assumed stereotype of Chinese acquirers overpaying for 
targets, Chinese firms actually pay on average 5% lower premia than non-Chinese 
firms, controlling for all other premia determinants. Raw data adjustments may 
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explain why the negative Chinese bid premia are found and I suggest cultural 
differences as potential explanations for the differentials.. 
Of course, the analyses and results in the thesis are not perfect. They may be subject 
to difficulties of data availability, mis-specification and some other problems, which I 
will introduce in the end of this thesis.
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9 Limitations and further research areas  
9.1 Pre-announcement information leak  
In this thesis, I only use the premia data based on target stock price one day before 
announcement. This is due to the time-smoothing effect and market return “noise”30.  
However, in the imperfect markets, such as China, the pre-acquisition information 
release may exist and influence directly the premia calculated. Since now concrete 
economic reasoning is identified in the thesis context, I stick to the most 
representative premia proxy. If further research on the information release can be 
done and the effects taken into premia analysis, the results can be more convincing 
and useful.  
 
9.2 Targets listed on the Chinese mainland stock exchanges  
Due to the special treatment of stocks traded on Chinese mainland stock exchanges, I 
excluded those observations from the analysis. This decision is for consistency 
purpose and to reduce unnecessary “noise” in the global bid premia dataset31.  
However, since the majority of Chinese acquisitions involve targets listed in these 
“doubtful” stock exchanges, the simple exlusion may cause sample slection bias in the 
analysis. Therefore, further research on this excluded dataset may be an interesting 
topic. For example, one can further the discussion towards how to derive the “correct” 
market price of targets under such unusual treatments and how to incorporate the 
updated premia data into a analytical framework. In this way, most Chinese 
acquisitions data could be taken into consideration and the results made more 
convincing. At the same time, practical guidelines for firms interested in Chinese 
targets may be developed as well.  
                                                             
30 More detailed reasoning can be found in Session 5.1.1: Choice of premia data 
31 More detailed reasoning can be found in Session 4.4.2: Chinese mainland stock exchanges.  
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9.3 Global bid premia outliers 
In the thesis, to get rid of the “outliers” and make the global M&A dataset comparable 
with the Chinese, I simply excluded the outliers with premia larger than 200%. This is 
due to the decreased accuracy of transaction data with over 200% premia and the 
large volume of global M&A transactions, which makes it almost impossible to track 
each outlier.32 Moreover, I did not set a lower bound for the premia, because the data 
always appear correct even when the premia are negative, and there is no concrete 
reason to exclude them.33 So the simple exclusion may cause sample selection bias.  
However, if more research can be done into those outlier observations, special 
acquisition arrangements can be figured out, and better cutlines or adjustments to the 
data can be made to be make the premia more “reasonable”, and a more 
comprehensive premia analysis framework can be presented.  
 
9.4 Limit on target stock markets in the regression analysis 
In the regression analysis, I use only the acquisition data with targets listed on the 
nine most popular stock exchanges. This is due to the fact that the worldwide 
transaction data are “noisy” and subject to different effects34 . By limiting the 
regression dataset to transactions on certain stock exchanges, much stock market 
influence not relevant to Chinese M&A activieties can be removed. 
However, the treatment only adjusts the “noisy” global dataset from stock exchange 
perspective, while leaving out other effects. If further adjustments can be made and 
the comparison is based on more comparable datasets, the results may have more 
economic implications and be more convincing.  
                                                             
32 More details can be found in the footnote 9 page 15. 
33 For example, I cannot exclude all negative premia data simply saying that the negative premia may hurt target’s 
shareholders and they will vote against it (Asplund & Kjellesvik, 2012).   
34 Seen in Session 5.1.2: Choice of target set 
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9.5 Exclusion of Model II results  
After the comparison of Model I and Model II in Session 6.5, I ultimately use Model I 
with fewer target-specific control variables for further discussions. This is due to the 
data availability problems of the Model II. Since it has less than one quarter of the 
useful observations in Model I, Model II suffers significant sample selection bias. 
Thus the results from Model II are not completely reliable.   
However, if more information on the ommited four explanatory variables can be 
found and some other powerful premia determinants identified, the new information 
could be incorporate into the Model I and may potentially yield a better explanatory 
model. 
 
9.6 Regression model specifications 
In the regression analysis, only linear general-to-specific modeling is applied. This is 
for the simplification purposes. Yet the reality is much more complicated, and 
previous scholars have suggested various advanced specification approaches, such as 
the weighted nonlinear least squares estimation (Billett & Ryngaert, 1997), the option 
pricing theory (Sudarsanam & Sorwar, 2010), and the natural logarithm transform of 
premium data (Rossi & Volpin, 2004). However, since no concrete economic reason 
has been identified for which form to use, rashly taking one of them may cause the 
over-specification problem.  
Therefore, if more research to the database is done and more specific relationships 
between bid premia and the determinants are identified, more sophisticated modeling 
can be used and the results will be improved dramatically.  
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Appendix  
Appendix 1: Chinese acquisition target listing stock exchange information 
The table summarizes Chinese acquisition target listing stock exchange information. The number in each cell is the number of Chinese M&A transactions that happened each year at each stock 
exchange. The percentage numbers in parenthesis represent the percentages that Chinese M&A transactions occupy among all M&A transactions at that stock exchange. 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Subtotal 
Hong Kong 12 
(5.45%) 
8 
(3.29%) 
23 
(9.47%) 
11 
(5.98%) 
8 
(4.55%) 
13 
(5.24%) 
27 
(12.27%) 
63 
(9.52%) 
20 
(13.33%) 
20 
(13.89%) 
21 
(15.91%) 
29 
(20.14%) 
41 
(20.71%) 
296 
(9.99%) 
Nasdaq 4 
(0.58%) 
1 
(0.15%) 
2 
(0.34%) 
4 
(0.62%) 
5 
(0.78%) 
6 
(0.69%) 
21 
(1.90%) 
10 
(1.46%) 
13 
(2.08%) 
38 
(5.64%) 
19 
(3.23%) 
12 
(2.36%) 
31 
(5.31%) 
166 
(1.87%) 
Australia 1 
(0.40%) 
1 
(0.20%) 
1 
(0.25%) 
2 
(0.65%) 
5 
(1.29%) 
18 
(3.13%) 
18 
(2.86%) 
32 
(4.97%) 
21 
(3.44%) 
20 
(5.26%) 
16 
(3.47%) 
16 
(4.47%) 
7 
(2.55%) 
158 
(2.73%) 
New York 2 
(0.58%) 
- 
1 
(0.23%) 
3 
(0.55%) 
1 
(0.17%) 
5 
(0.63%) 
17 
(2.41%) 
6 
(1.43%) 
3 
(0.58%) 
16 
(2.43%) 
9 
(1.79%) 
12 
(2.78%) 
15 
(2.67%) 
90 
(1.31%) 
US OTC 
- 
1 
(0.46%) 
3 
(1.81%) 
2 
(1.08%) 
1 
(0.45%) 
4 
(1.56%) 
7 
(2.26%) 
12 
(3.38%) 
9 
(4.35%) 
14 
(6.60%) 
8 
(4.88%) 
2 
(1.43%) 
2 
(1.12%) 
65 
(2.29%) 
Singapore 1 
(1.79%) 
- - 
2 
(1.90%) 
2 
(2.35%) 
1 
(1.19%) 
8 
(9.09%) 
(10 
10.99%) 
6 
(6.59%) 
7 
(8.97%) 
1 
(1.32%) 
11 
(15.28%) 
5 
(8.62%) 
54 
(5.43%) 
HK GEM 2 
(9.09%) 
2 
(3.13%) 
5 
(8.33%) 
6 
(9.84%) 
2 
(4.55%) 
2 
(4.00%) 
3 
(7.89%) 
6 
(6.00%) 
5 
(9.62%) 
4 
16.00%) 
5 
(20.00%) 
5 
(33.33%) 
5 
(12.20%) 
52 
(8.71%) 
TSXVenture 
- - - 
1 
(0.65%) 
- 
1 
(0.29%) 
9 
(2.60%) 
6 
(1.27%) 
4 
(1.31%) 
8 
(2.71%) 
4 
(1.43%) 
4 
(1.82%) 
1 
(0.53%) 
38 
(1.22%) 
Toronto - - 1 - 1 2 3 6 4 5 4 1 1 28 
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(0.49%) (0.34%) (0.59%) (0.73%) (1.39%) (1.27%) (1.42%) (1.27%) (0.41%) (0.47%) (0.76%) 
London AIM 
- - - - - 
3 
(1.91%) 
3 
(1.29%) 
4 
(1.90%) 
4 
(2.84%) 
5 
(4.85%) 
1 
(1.02%) 
4 
(5.13%) 
- 
24 
(1.63%) 
Subtotal 22 
(1.00%) 
13 
(0.54%) 
36 
(1.55%) 
31 
(1.27%) 
25 
(0.89%) 
55 
(1.48%) 
116 
(2.84%) 
155 
(3.81%) 
89 
(2.95%) 
137 
(4.69%) 
88 
(3.33%) 
96 
(4.34%) 
108 
(4.57%) 
971 
(2.61%) 
Data source: SDC Platinum Merger & Acquisition database 
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Appendix 2: Correction for Chinese acquisition premia dataset 
 
The table lists all possible errors or mistreatments for the Chinese acquisition premia in SDC Platinum M&A 
database. The corrections are based on public available reports or SEC filings.  
Date 
Announced 
Target Name 
Acquiror 
Name 
Premium 
Paid (1 day) 
Treatment Reason 
02/26/09 
Pacific Ore 
Ltd 
Bayannoer 
Western 
Copper 
354.55 
Exclude 
observation 
The transaction was Western Areas' 
special arrangement to acquire 100% 
of the BioHeap leaching technology 
from Pacific Ore Ltd, not exactly an 
acquisition. 
03/25/11 
Funtalk China 
Holdings Ltd 
Fortress 
Group Ltd 
666.63 
Change the 
premium to 17.07 
The original premium is wrong, with 
the offer price at $7.20, the premium 
shall be 17.07. 
05/06/11 SMIC 
Datang 
Hldg(HK)Inv
est Co Ltd 
618.63 
Change the 
premium to -50 
The original premium is wrong, with 
the offer price at HK$ 0.36 per share, 
the premium shall be around -50. 
05/08/12 
Sino Gas Intl 
Hldgs Inc 
Investor 
Group 
2446.13 
Exclude 
observation 
No acquisition proof was found in its 
annual report 2012. 
10/03/12 
Feihe 
International 
Inc 
Infant 
Formula 
Merger Sub 
Hldg 
662.33 
Change the 
premium data to 
6.47 
The original premium is wrong, with 
the offer price at $7.40, the premium 
shall be 21.31. 
12/30/12 
Media 
Gruppa 
"Voyna i Mir" 
Dzaya 
Finance Ltd 
1390.07 
Exclude 
observation 
No public available information on the 
transaction, too many missing 
variables of the company. 
07/22/13 Forterra Trust 
New Precise 
Holdings Ltd 
785.95 
Change the 
premium to 
131.55 
The original premium is wrong, with 
the offer price at $2.98, the premium 
shall be 131.55 
08/30/13 
China 
Gaoxian 
Fibre Fabric 
Fleur Growth 
Fund Ltd 
428.94 
Change the 
premium to -32.43 
The transaction was accomplished by 
issuing additional shares and warrants 
to  Fleur Growth Fund Limited at an 
price of S$0.10 per Share, thus the 
premium shall be around -32.43 
09/06/13 
Longlife 
Group 
Holdings Ltd 
Chongqing 
Fuan Pharm 
(Grp) Co 
347.57 
Exclude 
observation 
The transaction was merely the target 
tender of new shares to Fuan, not a 
merger agreement. 
10/23/13 
BlueStar 
SecuTech Inc 
BlueStar 
SecuTech Inc 
516.62 
Change the 
premium data to 
-39.47 
The original premium is wrong, with 
the offer price at 2.5 pence and last 
trading date price at 4.13 pence, the 
premium shall be -39.47 
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08/25/14 
China 
Housing & 
Land Dvlp 
Inc 
China 
Housing & 
Land Dvlp 
Inc 
477.19 change to 2.64 
This is the Reverse Stock Split, with 
the offer price at $7.50, the premium 
shall be 2.64 
09/22/14 
Jinpan 
International 
Ltd 
Investor 
Group 
677.44 
Change the 
premium data to 
26.62 
The original premium is wrong, with 
the offer price at $8.80, the premium 
shall be 26.62 
Data source: SDC Platnium and separate deal reports 
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Appendix 3: General-to-specific regression modeling results  
 
The table summarizes the regression results of the two general-to-specific modelings based on independent 
variables with 9000+ observations and 4500+ observations specified in Chapter 6. The Model I&II (general) are the 
general models respectively, the model Model I&II (10%) only include variables that are significant under 10% 
significant level, while the Model I&II (5%)are the final models with all coefficients significant under 5% significant 
level. 
 Model I 
(general) 
Model I 
(10%) 
Model I 
(5%) 
Model II 
(general) 
Model II 
(10%) 
Model II 
(5%) 
Chinese acquirer -3.713 -4.896 -5.152 14.317 14.029  
 (1.36) (2.05)* (2.15)* (1.60) (1.74)  
Market index return -28.309 -29.278 -29.029 -26.750 -37.580 -37.513 
 (7.80)** (8.39)** (8.33)** (3.51)** (5.95)** (5.93)** 
Hong Kong Stock  
Exchange 
4.324   30.919   
(0.85)   (1.63)   
Nasdaq Stock  
Exchange 
-4.292 -3.979 -4.031 10.579 4.048 4.032 
(1.34) (2.17)* (2.20)* (0.87) (3.04)** (3.02)** 
Australia Stock  
Exchange   
-6.569   -71.804   
(1.21)   (2.90)**   
New York Stock  
Exchange 
-9.614 -9.088 -8.969 8.502   
(2.96)** (4.87)** (4.82)** (0.70)   
Singapore Stock  
Exchange  
2.471   -24.681   
(0.46)   (1.18)   
London–AIM 
Market 
-5.357 -4.668 -4.853 -5.429   
(1.24) (2.86)** (2.98)** (0.40)   
HK GEM Market 0.435   26.595   
(0.08)   (1.26)   
Toronto 0.475   -0.567   
 (0.31)   (0.07)   
China -23.305 -17.988 -17.916 -41.572   
 (5.37)** (6.75)** (6.73)** (2.27)*   
Hong Kong -15.798 -8.262 -8.716 -40.798 -17.108 -16.497 
 (3.33)** (6.38)** (6.84)** (2.62)** (4.17)** (4.11)** 
Australia 3.516   76.343   
 (0.67)   (3.36)**   
Canada -1.070   16.534   
 (0.31)   (1.54)   
Singapore -6.582   27.117   
 (1.28)   (1.51)   
United States 4.970 6.268 6.387 -0.407   
 (2.04)* (3.32)** (3.38)** (0.07)   
United Kingdom -3.560   1.325   
 (0.95)   (0.14)   
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Year 2003 0.216   6.659 5.494 5.328 
 (0.11)   (2.34)* (2.79)** (2.70)** 
Year 2004 -5.451 -4.468 -4.382 1.186   
 (2.78)** (3.20)** (3.14)** (0.45)   
Year 2005 -0.579   3.109   
 (0.30)   (1.18)   
Year 2006 -1.538   3.467   
 (0.81)   (1.24)   
Year 2007 -1.833   6.581   
 (0.99)   (2.34)*   
Year 2008 2.006 3.196 3.059 9.491   
 (1.07) (2.33)* (2.23)* (2.96)**   
Year 2009 6.022 7.329 7.140 21.174 17.211 17.264 
 (3.11)** (5.75)** (5.63)** (5.27)** (5.87)** (5.87)** 
Year 2010 5.263 6.220 6.070 14.398 11.561 11.680 
 (2.74)** (4.80)** (4.69)** (4.33)** (4.54)** (4.59)** 
Year 2011 5.554 6.495 6.395 11.260 6.665 6.922 
 (2.87)** (4.74)** (4.67)** (3.39)** (2.52)* (2.61)** 
Year 2012 6.810 7.960 7.929 14.730 9.059 8.777 
 (3.46)** (5.72)** (5.70)** (4.57)** (3.53)** (3.41)** 
Year 2013 2.618 3.620 3.649 6.361   
 (1.25) (2.32)* (2.34)* (1.91)   
Year 2014 -1.061   7.074   
 (0.51)   (2.05)*   
Acquirer from 
investment 
commodity industry 
-6.510 -6.028 -7.134 -1.316 -3.717 -4.407 
(4.89)** (6.48)** (8.56)** (0.57) (2.54)* (3.07)** 
Acquirer from 
mining industry 
-0.044   9.679   
(0.02)   (1.05)   
Acquirer from 
business services 
industry 
-2.272   2.549 4.910  
(1.15)   (0.70) (1.69)  
Acquirer from metal 
and metal products 
industry 
-2.204   -0.449   
(0.71)   (0.09)   
Acquirer from oil 
and gas, petroleum 
industry 
-4.472 -3.153 -3.469 0.745   
(1.67) (1.93) (2.13)* (0.14)   
Acquirer from 
electronic and 
electrical equipment 
industry 
2.710 4.164  -1.916   
(0.94) (1.78)  (0.42)   
Acquirer from real 
estate, mortgage 
-2.191   0.647   
(0.66)   (0.14)   
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banker industry  
Acquirer from 
prepackaged 
software industry 
5.311 6.859 6.546 4.692 8.676 7.789 
(2.05)* (3.16)** (3.02)** (1.00) (2.58)** (2.32)* 
Acquirer from 
electric, gas, and 
water distribution 
industry 
-2.117   7.118   
(0.55)   (1.04)   
Acquirer from food 
and kindred products 
industry 
4.352 5.502  17.613 12.494 11.523 
(1.06) (1.74)  (2.85)** (3.13)** (2.92)** 
Acquirers from 
commercial banks 
industry  
-3.327   3.548   
(1.37)   (1.24)   
Acquirer from 
holding companies 
(except banks) 
industry 
-3.977   1.535   
(1.09)   (0.16)   
Acquirer from drugs 
industry 
10.353 10.276 9.931 3.850 10.041  
(3.45)** (4.93)** (4.78)** (0.79) (2.16)*  
Acquirer from air 
transportation and 
shipping industry  
-16.295   23.501   
(1.94)   (1.19)   
Acquirer from 
transportation 
equipment industry  
0.432   -1.319   
(0.08)   (0.16)   
Acquirer from textile 
and apparel products 
industry 
4.185   -16.389   
(0.63)   (1.23)   
Acquirer from 
machinery industry  
0.517   -3.064   
(0.13)   (0.62)   
Acquirer from 
wholesale 
trade-durable goods 
industry 
7.779 8.217  14.315 9.499  
(2.14)* (2.33)*  (2.53)* (1.82)  
Acquirer from stone, 
clay, glass, and 
concrete products 
industry 
2.835   -9.302   
(0.35)   (0.72)   
Acquirer from 
construction firms 
industry  
6.152   0.419   
(1.36)   (0.06)   
Target from mining 
industry 
0.957   -2.589   
(0.53)   (0.27)   
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Target from 
electronic and 
electrical equipment 
industry 
1.983   5.155 8.825 8.935 
(0.82)   (1.22) (2.56)* (2.60)** 
Target from business 
services industry  
2.033   -1.157   
(1.30)   (0.41)   
Target from real 
estate; mortgage 
bankers industry  
3.877   4.440   
(1.54)   (1.03)   
Target from food and 
kindred products  
industry  
0.944   -2.427   
(0.29)   (0.40)   
Target from oil and 
gas; petroleum 
refining industry 
1.708   2.506   
(0.72)   (0.49)   
Target from electric, 
gas, and water 
distribution industry 
-4.761 -6.456 -6.686 -6.490   
(1.40) (2.47)* (2.56)* (1.14)   
Target from 
investment 
commodity industry  
1.303   -3.777   
(0.81)   (1.32)   
Target from metal 
and metal products 
industry  
0.724   3.453   
(0.22)   (0.70)   
Target from 
machinery industry  
3.827   4.587   
(1.23)   (0.88)   
Target from 
prepackaged 
software industry 
1.536   -2.789   
(0.77)   (0.72)   
Target from drugs 
industry  
-0.139   7.333 7.960 14.724 
(0.05)   (1.58) (1.82) (5.21)** 
Target from  
chemicals and allied 
products industry 
1.937   -9.388   
(0.61)   (2.28)*   
Target from textile 
and apparel products  
industry  
-5.270   19.442   
(1.21)   (1.66)   
Target from 
commercial banks 
industry  
1.698   -1.676   
(0.70)   (0.57)   
Target from 
transportation 
equipment industry  
-2.994   4.306   
(0.62)   (0.56)   
Target from -2.360   10.095   
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communications 
equipment industry  
(0.71)   (1.72)   
Target from air 
transportation and 
shipping industry 
9.182   2.212 20.518  
(1.37)   (0.18) (1.84)  
Target from stone, 
clay, glass, and 
concrete products 
industry 
6.317   18.537 14.509 13.598 
(1.05)   (2.59)** (2.11)* (1.97)* 
Target from 
transportation and 
shipping industry  
-2.638   1.234   
(1.00)   (0.37)   
Target from 
wholesale 
trade-durable goods 
industry  
-4.033 -5.112  -4.717   
(1.32) (1.72)  (0.94)   
Target from 
wholesale 
trade-nondurable 
goods industry  
-6.480 -7.984 -7.628 9.061   
(1.64) (2.06)* (1.97)* (1.36)   
Target from hotels 
and casinos industry 
12.098 11.181 11.035 9.669 13.810 13.361 
(3.32)** (3.14)** (3.10)** (2.12)* (2.91)** (2.81)** 
Target from motion 
picture production 
industry  
6.356   18.637   
(1.45)   (1.93)   
Target from 
advertising services 
industry  
-9.182 -10.221  13.966   
(1.52) (1.71)  (1.49)   
Acquirers with 
management 
11.310 11.549 11.324 13.379 15.593 15.728 
(3.82)** (3.99)** (3.91)** (3.59)** (4.05)** (4.07)** 
Acquirer as financial 
firm 
-2.056   -3.569   
(1.04)   (1.21)   
Buyside 
government-owned 
involvement 
1.270   1.916   
(0.69)   (0.56)   
Public acquirer 1.317 1.641  -0.572   
(1.09) (1.73)  (0.29)   
Sellside 
government-owned 
involvement 
1.486   -7.447 -10.291  
(0.46)   (1.23) (1.81)  
Geographical cross- 
border 
5.996 6.063 6.118 5.390 8.483 8.788 
(5.13)** (7.15)** (7.27)** (1.83) (4.12)** (4.28)** 
Exchange-based 
cross-border 
-0.274   0.610   
(0.19)   (0.18)   
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Hostile 12.296 12.561 12.484 3.791   
 (2.36)* (2.42)* (2.40)* (0.56)   
Competing bidder 11.841 11.863 11.929 1.223 5.731  
(5.42)** (5.46)** (5.49)** (0.37) (1.70)  
% of shares acquired 0.170 0.168 0.172 0.113 0.107 0.121 
(9.56)** (9.81)** (10.06)** (3.30)** (3.32)** (3.77)** 
Post-acquisition 
ownership over 50% 
6.629 6.634 6.590 14.947 15.529 14.742 
(4.50)** (4.63)** (4.60)** (4.99)** (5.57)** (5.29)** 
Tender offer 6.632 6.844 6.944 2.111 2.391 2.782 
 (7.33)** (7.76)** (7.89)** (1.53) (1.70) (1.98)* 
Going private 5.849 5.600 4.738 -0.100   
 (4.51)** (4.52)** (4.17)** (0.04)   
Cross-industry -0.395   -0.575   
 (0.41)   (0.39)   
Poison pill 15.718 15.193 14.889 19.562 21.498 21.934 
 (2.83)** (2.76)** (2.70)** (2.68)** (2.92)** (2.97)** 
Acquirer from the 
US 
3.413 2.958 2.900 4.243 6.751 6.611 
(2.08)* (2.46)* (2.41)* (1.15) (3.55)** (3.48)** 
Acquirer from 
Canada 
-1.145   -4.193   
(0.56)   (0.96)   
Acquirer from Hong 
Kong 
2.328   24.606 13.585 12.658 
(1.02)   (4.49)** (3.08)** (2.91)** 
Acquirer from 
Australia 
0.834   1.396   
(0.36)   (0.26)   
Acquirer from the 
UK 
3.481   5.057   
(1.57)   (1.16)   
Acquirer from 
Singapore 
2.158   0.759   
(0.80)   (0.13)   
Acquirer from Japan 5.732   -4.350   
(1.49)   (0.77)   
M/B     0.047 -0.038 -0.038 
    (1.20) (2.24)* (2.19)* 
Target LT debt/equity     -0.008 0.051 0.050 
   (0.32) (2.27)* (2.22)* 
Target ROE    -0.023   
    (1.33)   
Percentage of cash    0.076 0.078 0.086 
   (2.85)** (2.96)** (3.26)** 
_cons 0.992 -1.787 -0.351 -25.452 -16.135 -16.381 
 (0.23) (1.48) (0.35) (1.87) (5.08)** (5.16)** 
R2 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.34 0.25 0.25 
N 9,206 9,206 9,206 1,621 2,257 2,257 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
